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I. INTRODUCTION
For some, of a dramatic nature, to conjure up the image of hot zones, now
associated with the deadly ebola virus, will be apt indeed. Punitive damages
flowing forth from the unprincipled, uncontrolled jury may be likened to an
infection in the law that introduces a systemic disease in the American society
and economy. This essay is for the more phlegmatic.
By means of a more dispassionate analysis of the law and its purposes I
want to suggest the appropriateness of the rules relating to punitive damages. I
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refer first to the deep common law roots of punitive damages in tort law. They
were and are designed to regulate and support a civil society. These deep roots
have not always been recognized, because of the modem law's drive to divorce
tort from criminal law. In Section III I show how our thinking about tort law
has been tailored to unitary theories. In that process, the goals of tort law have
been separated from criminal law. Section IV demonstrates that the substantive
rules relating to punitive damages are remarkably consistent throughout time and
common law jurisdiction. The formula is exceedingly open-textured inviting a
broad discretion in applying the sanction of punitive damages to particular
circumstances. The predominant formula requires a high degree of culpability;
the harmful act must have exhibited arrogance in disregarding the rights of the
injured party. With the development of the substantive law and the struggles of
the courts to fit punitives in with the formulations of tort law, courts and scholars
have been heavily engaged in exploring the rationale of punitive damages. Are
they to compensate, to deter, or to wreak retribution? I argue that each rationale
has strengths but ultimately fails as a basis to justify the imposition of punitive
damages. In Section VII suggest a theory that supplies a more satisfactory basis
for punitives. It has historical strength, deriving from punitive damages' role in
meeting the necessities of running and solidifying social institutions. It further
has theoretical veracity in its consistency with a republic model of liberty that
pervades American jurisprudence.
Section VII refers to evidence about the incidence and severity of punitive
damages. From the empirical data, we can discern that problem punitives are
localized. They are not a uniform national disease. The existence, however, of
problem punitives prompts questions about why these "hot zones" well up in our
legal midst. Only close empirical work will answer this question. The
remainder of this article sets forth an agenda for such work. The hypothesis to
be tested in future work is that "hot zones" occur not because of loose or
unstable substantive and procedural rules, but rather stem from social failure.
The law assigns the awarding of punitive damages to the jury with a broad, only
loosely reviewed, discretion. There is good reason for this. Punitive damages
do not represent an aberration in the legal fabric, let alone a threat to our
economic system. But the rules presuppose, and themselves construct, a
responsible, informed, deliberative, traditional, and self-governing community.
Once these conditions are forfeited, problem punitives are likely to be awarded.
The suggestion, then, is that problem punitives will be found in communities
where the conditions of institutional responsibility have been eroded. The
implications of reform are profound, and as I urge in Section VIII, any change
should take place in full appreciation of those implications.
Careful, dispassionate empirical work is crucial for without it, the endeavors
of courts and legislatures may badly miss their mark. Present law reform may,
at best, be futile, or, at worst, be destructive of an essential element in our
jurisprudence scheme. The former may be exemplified by the Supreme Court's
assiduous attempts to introduce due process procedures. These are unlikely to
be efficacious. The latter are exemplified by reforms that propose abolition,
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caps, or proportionality, which diminish the retributive goals of the law, and do
great violence to the liberal-republican fabric of our society.
II. THE COMMON LAW ROOTS
With the common law rules of punitive damages, as with the common law as
a whole, it is surprising how alike the doctrines appear over its many jurisdictions.'
The principles relating to an award of damages in Melbourne, Victoria, take much
the same form to those prevailing in a court awarding punitives in Melbourne,
Florida.2 Yet the experience with frequency and severity of punitive damages is
vastly different. Experience is a product of forces other than the rules of
substantive law. It is reflective of the strong remedial stance of American courts
Where the criminal law is inadequate in mapping the wrongs which should be
prescribed, American courts have employed tort law with the potent remedy of
punitive damages to cover the field. But more fundamentally, the broader use of
punitive damages draws from a faith in the institutions of a liberal-republican form
of government. One would expect punitive damages to have withered in
Commonwealth countries where Parliament is overwhelmingly the source of law.4
Yet the courts will not let it go. It is unsurprising to find that punitive damages
flourish in the rich American soil that asserts a faith in the democraticizing
institution of the jury and the rights of the individual. Punitive damages in
Commonwealth tort law are then a remarkable vestige of Common law dominance
found in the pre-Nineteenth Century.s The assault on them has lasted long, yet
they stand. It is instructive to review briefly this assault since it may cast light on
the present-day attack throughout the United States.
Punitive damages law is conventionally traced to the Eighteenth Century
English decisions that upheld jury verdicts that exceeded the plaintiff's actual
1. See generally P.S. Atiyah & Robert S. Summers, Form and Substance in Anglo-American
Law 175 (1987).
2. Johns-Manville Sales Corp. v. Janssens, 463 So. 2d 242 (Fla. App. 1984) (stressing in
punitive damages award the defendant's knowledge of the dangerousness of asbestos). Compare
Coloca v. B.P. Australia [1992] 2 V.R. 441 (punitive damages available for defendant's exposing
plaintiff to asbestos dust and fibers, if in "contumelious disregard of plaintiffs rights'). Note that
Florida Statutes, 1991 § 768.72(2), provides for 60% of the punitive damages award to be paid either
to the Public Medical Assistance Trust Fund (personal injuries) or to the General Revenue Fund (any
other claims).
3. Marc Galanter, When Legal Worlds Collide: Reflections on Bhopal, The Good Lawyer, and
the American Law School, 36 J. Legal Educ. 292, 298-301 (1986) (pointing to the strong American
remedial system).
. 4. Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen, Introduction: History, Historicism, and the Culture
of Rights, to A Culture of Rights: The Bill of Rights in Philosophy, Politics and Law in 1791-1991,
at 17 (Michael J. Lacey & Knud Haakonssen eds., 1991).
5. Ashby v. White, 2 Ld. Raym. 938, 92 Eng. Rep. 126 (K.B. 1702); 1 Brown P.C. 62, 1 Eng.
Rep. 417 (H.L. 1703) (Lord Holt finding a cause of action to lie against an officer interfering with
the right to vote). See W.R. Cornish & G. de N. Clark, Law and Society in England 1750-1950, at
12 (1989).
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physical harm.6 It was in 1763 that an English court employed the term
"exemplary damages." 7 Lord Devlin, in the seminal case Rookes v. Barnard,8
found that the courts began to award punitive damages mainly in cases involving
abuse of public office. This, however, represents a crimped view of the courts'
powers. Throughout the history of the common law juries, where they were able
to award damages, juries had the authority to grant damages in excess of the
level necessary for compensation.' The jury was a powerful institution in the
common law process; the judges had no capacity or interest in checking or
reviewing the quantum of any award. The judges, when they began to develop
a more rule-based body of law, explicitly confirmed an already well-established
practice of the jury in setting damages at a super-compensatory level where the
circumstances demanded such awards. Thus, the United States Supreme Court
in Molzof v. United States'0 was able to confidently conclude that "'punitive'
damages has a long pedigree in the law.""
The imminence of punitive damages in the law predates verbal identification.
Early tort law was mixed with the criminal law. Prior to trespass, an aggrieved
person, when pleading, would utter "words of felony," which would enable
recovery of the b6t, a tariff set according to the crime to be extracted from the
goods of the malefactor. 2 The writ of trespass was introduced to spread the
power of the King throughout the realm quietening it to the rule of law. When
Edward I introduced the action into Wales, it was set forth in strong words "its
punitive and exemplary character."" The law assuaged loss as a byproduct of
bringing effective law to the land. The modem separation of punishment and
compensation had no place. The plaintiff was unable to plead his actual loss. 4
The harm to the plaintiff itself was irrelevant as many law students learn from
6. Dorsey D. Ellis, Jr., Fairness and Efficiency in the Law of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal.
L. Rev. 1, 12 (1982) ("The common law authority for courts to award punitive damages originated
in eighteenth-century England"); Richard C. Ausness, Retribution and Deterrence: The Role of
Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Ky. L.J. 1, 3 (1985) ("The modem concept of
punitive damages originated in England during the eighteenth century ....
7. Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (LB. 1763).
8. 1964 App. Cas. 1129, 1222.
9. Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd., 117 C.L.R. 118, 152 (1966). See also Ellis, supra
note 6, at 12-13 (discussing the power of the jury and the gradual willingness of judges to review
awards). Juries had wide discretion which was in early law checked only by the writ of attaint,
George T. Washington, Damages in Contract at Common Law, 47 L.Q. Rev. 345, 349 (1931); the
writ declined in the 15th and early 16th Centuries, id. at 362. Indicating the wide power of the jury,
the word "damages" was defined as "that which jurors are to inquire of' or as Lord Coke said:
"recompense that is given by the jury." George T. Washington, Damages in Contract at Common
Law, 48 L.Q. Rev. 90 (1932).
10. 112 S. Ct. 711 (1992).
11. Id. at 715 (the Court cited Day v. Woodworth, 13 How. 363, 14 L.Ed. 181 (1852)).
12. Sir Frederick Pollock & Frederic W. Maitland, History of English Law Before the Time
of Edward I, Vol. 11525 (2d ed. 1911).
13. Pollock & Maitland, supra note 12, at 527.
14. Pollock & Maitland, supra note 12, at 458-60.
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the early assault case of I De S et ux. v. W Des." Damages were given to keep
the peace. At a time of weak central authority and policy it was the private
cause of action in trespass and the trespass on the case that performed the
civilizing function. The idea of honor ran deep. In actions "before an English
local court of the thirteenth century, the plaintiff will claim compensation, not
only for damages (damnum) but also for the shame (huntage, hontage, dedecus,
pudor, vituporium) that had been done to him." In the King's Courts this
element was regarded in the awarding of damages. 6 In the Eighteenth Century
the power of the jury to express its view of the defendant's action by large award
was a constitutional right. 7 Its social role is plainly witnessed in its capacity
toset damages at a level to discourage the dangerous practice of dueling."
The emphasis on the compensatory nature of tort damages is a creature of
modem tort law, where a conceptual break has been made from criminal law.
The experience of the law in the Star Chamber began a process where the worlds
of crime and tort were separated for most purposes. Their admixture in the
1630s in vindictive prosecutions and punishments led to the end of the Star
Chamber.' 9 The thoroughgoing reliance upon private rights of action gave way
as government agents became effective, and from the viewpoint of the citizen,
safer prosecutors. However, the criminal law roots of tort have remained fast in
the award of punitive damages.20
It is only the English courts that have found punitive damages confuse the civil
and criminal functions of the law and are thus anomalous in the civil sphere."
But most courts in the common law have agreed with the sentiments of Justice
Windeyer of the Australian High Court in Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons:
15. Y.B. Lib. Ass. folio 99, placitium 60 (1348).
16. Pollock & Maitland, supra note 12, at 537-38.
17. Huckle v. Money, 95 Eng. Rep. 768 (K.B. 1763).
18. Merest v. Harvey, 128 Eng. Rep. 761 (1814) ("It goes to prevent the practice of duel-
ling ... "). In the same case, the social aspect of the award is emphasized by Gibbs C.J. "I wish
to know, in a case where a man disregards every principle which actuates the conduct of a gentlemen,
what is to restrain him except large damages?" Id. The social aspect does not resonate with modem
commentators, see Ellis, supra note 6, at 29. See Michael Tilbury, Factors Inflating Damages
Awards, in Essays on Damages 98-106 (P.D. Finn ed., 1992).
19. John H. Baker, An Introduction to English Legal History 137 (3d ed. 1990); see also Ellis,
supra note 6, at 8 (discussing the historical roots of award damages to mollify anti-social behavior).
20. Some modem tort theorists insist strongly on the private nature of tort law maintaining that
compensation should be exclusive function of tort law, see Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea of Private
Law 135 (1995) (arguing that England under Rookes v. Barnard comes closest to his concept of
corrective justice).
21. Broome v. Cassell & Co., 1972 App. Cas. 1027, 1087. The early English cases were
widely cited to allow American courts to give supercompensatory damages where "the injury is
inflicted under circumstances of aggravation, insult or cruelty, with vindictiveness and malice; but
in view of all such circumstances, to impose what is sanctions called exemplary and sometimes
punitory damages, in addition to the actual damages." McWilliams v. Bragg, 3 Wis. 424,431 (1854).
The deterrent notion was stressed, Whipple v. Walpole, 10 N.H. 130, 132 (1839). Michael Rustad
& Thomas Koenig, The Historical Continuity of Punitive Damages Awards: Reforming the Tort
Reformers, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1269 (1993).
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Compensation is the dominant remedy if not the purpose of the law of
torts today. But fault still has a place in many forms of wrongdoing.
And the roots of tort and crime in the law of England are greatly
intermingled. Some things that today are seen as anomalies have roots
that go deep, too deep for them to be easily uprooted.'
Lord Devlin could not live with the apparent anomaly, declaring in Rookes
v. Barnard' that punitive damages be restricted to three narrow categories,
namely: (1) "oppressive, arbitrary, or unconstitutional actions by servants of the
government;" (2) cases in which "defendant's conduct has been calculated by
him to make a profit for himself which may well exceed the compensation
payable to the plaintiff;" and (3) where the award is expressly authorized by
statute. 4  Even to admit these categories was a grudging concession to
precedent. So disgruntled was Lord Devlin that he thought the court may have
to reform the law by prescribing an "arbitrary limit on awards of [punitive]
damages."25  This penchant for rejection did not find acceptance in other
Commonwealth law jurisdictions. Lord Devlin's categories were savaged by
some of his brethren, Lords Reid and Wilberforce.26 Lord Wilberforce directly
undermined Lord Devlin's aversion to non-compensatory goals. He recognized
that while compensation may be the predominant principle in tort damages,
"there is ... a delictual element which contemplates some penalty for the
defendant."" He went on to say:
It cannot lightly be taken for granted, even as a matter of theory, that
the purpose of the law of tort is compensation, still less that it ought to
be, an issue of large social import, or that there is something inappropri-
ate or illogical or anomalous (a question-begging word) in including a
punitive element in civil damages, or, conversely, that the criminal law,
rather than the civil law, is in these cases the better instrument for
conveying social disapproval, or for redressing a wrong to the social
fabric, or that damages in any case can be broken down into the two
separate elements. As a matter of practice English law has not
committed itself to any of these theories: it may have been wiser than
it knew.2"
22. Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd., 117 C.L.IL 118, 149-50 (1966).
23. 1964 App. Cas. 1129.
24. Id. at 1226-27.
25. Id. at 1227. In A.B. v. South West Water Services, 1993 Q.B. 507, the Court applied the
categories of Lord Devlin as though it were interpreting a statute, Sir Thomas Bingham M.R. at 530-
31.
26. Broome v. Cassell, 1972 App. Cas. 1027, 1087, 1114.
27. Id. at 1114.
28. Id.
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The restrictive English approach has been an unhappy experiment. It has
found no following elsewhere in the Commonwealth and is now, on its own turf,
questioned by the English Law Commission in a Consultation Paper.29 The
Commission submits for consideration a widening of the English rule that would
permit the award of punitive (exemplary) damages where it is proved that "(a)
the parties were in a relationship of inequality at the time of the wrong, and (b)
that there has been conscious and deliberate wrongdoing by the defendant which
shows a contumelious disregard for the plaintiff's rights."3 The Law Commis-
sion does not see the overlap in the purposes of criminal law and an award of
punitive damages as a fatal blow against the legitimacy of punitive damages.
The English courts, however, have set their face against recovery of punitives
outside the narrow confines of earlier law and will not contemplate their recovery
when the action sounds in negligence.3 ' This runs counter to Australian cases
that have allowed punitive damages because of the defendant's conduct rather
than the formal pleading of the tort.32
The unsettled place of punitive damages in Commonwealth law stems from
the compartmentalization of civil law and criminal law. Those same forces are
at play in the United States, but the stakes are higher in the schizophrenic
American legal culture. Like the English law, the realms of tort and criminal
law have been divided, but unlike the English law, the remedial rights-based
jurisprudence is still alive and calls for the use of punitives where the criminal
law has failed to map the field of wrongs that call for remedy. That call results
in punitive damages being a marked characteristic on the face of American tort
law, while they are rare, if juristically controversial, exceptions to the dominant
drive for compensatory damages.33
III. THE RISE OF UNITARY THEORY
The history of mixed purposes reflected the indispensable role of tort law in
the evolving society. This, however, appeared untidy to later theorists and some
courts. The English courts were dominated by a Benthamite faith that they
should be subordinate to Parliament.' To be intimately involved in social
regulation through common law rules ran counter to their subordinate role. At
best, they were institutions that gave redress for recognized wrongs, redress that
29. The Law Commission Consultation Paper #132, H.M.S.O. 1993.
30. Id., at Para. 616, p. 136.
31. A.B. v. South West Water Services Ltd., 1993 Q.B. 507 (rejecting a nuisance action as
founding a claim for punitive damages).
32. Lamb v. Cotogno (1987] 164 C.L.R. 1; Coloca v. B.P. Australia Ltd. [1992] 2 V.R. 441.
33. Punitive or exemplary damages are found mainly in defamation cases where the very nature
of the interest protected-reputation--defies the conventional compensation analysis. See Michael
Tilbury, supra note 18, at 86, 90-92, 95-99.
34. For discussion see Gerald J. Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition 263-301
(1986).
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for tort was compensation. Deterrence or retribution, with their public policy and
social morality aspect, were functions reserved for the legislative and the
executive prescription. The courts' function was purely supplementary-it was
the cat's paw."
In the United States the courts remained active social institutions, untouched
by the Benthamite attack, but were increasingly subjected to social science
perspectives of their functioning.36 The realists and, later, the law and econo-
mists gave tort law an outside perspective that isolated its purposes as the
rationally comprehensible goals of compensation and optimal deterrence. 7 The
society-based mixed system was set aside. In this context it was conventional
to separate tort and criminal law. Tort law was seen as a pricing scheme.38 On
the other hand, criminal law was left as a system that carried the full sanctioning
weight of the law which may vindicate the victim and wreak retribution. (I leave
these terms vague because the courts were rarely intent upon giving them any
exact definition.) The idea was that criminal law was public law with all the
symbolism of the penalty exacted by the state.39 It is little wonder that the
legitimacy of courts awarding punitive damages was deeply questioned.' If
punitive damages were to be justified, that must be found in a compensation or
35. In Shaw v. Director of Public Prosecutions, 1962 App. Cas. 220, the House of Lords
created the offense of conspiracy to corrupt public morals, a common law crime. The exercise of
such power was singular, see R v. Gibson, [1991] 1 All E.R. 439.
36. William W. Fischer, III, Morton J. Horwitz, and Thomas A. Reed, American Legal Realism
232-36 (1993) (describing the evolving dominance of the social sciences). The Benthamite agenda
was for legislative law reform--"a fully rational, systemic science of legislation, the immediate focus
of which was criminal jurisprudence." Postema, supra note 34, at 263.
37. The spirit was summed up by Felix S. Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional
Approach, 35 Colum. L. Rev. 809, 821 (1935) (recommending substitution of a "realistic, rational,
scientific account of legal happenings for the classical theological jurisprudence of concepts"); G.
Edward White, From Sociological Jurisprudence to Realism: Jurisprudence and Social Change in
Early Twentieth-Century America, 58 Va. L. Rev. 999, 1024-26 (1972); Anthony T. Kronman, The
Lost Lawyer: Failing Ideals of the Legal Profession 170-270 (1993) (the author includes the school
of Critical Legal Studies).
38. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Property Rules Versus Liability Rules: An Economic
Analysis, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 713, 715 (1996) (describing liability rules under which the state
discourages violations "by requiring transgressors to pay victims for harms suffered"). See John C.
Coffee, Jr., Does "Unlawful" Mean "Criminal"?: Reflections on the Disappearing Tort/Crime
Distinction in American Law, 71 B.U. L. Rev. 193, 222 (1991).
39. Cf Robert W. Drane & David J. Neal, On Moral Justifications for the Tort/Crime
Distinction, 68 Calif. L. Rev. 398 (1980) (suggesting a firm moral line between tort and crime). For
a thoroughgoing discussion of the tort and crime distinction, see Symposium: The Intersection of Tort
and Criminal Law, 76 B.U.L. Rev. 1-371 (1996).
40. Part of this was a loss in faith, perhaps a civilizing move that vindica-
tion/punishment/retribution should be publicized. A. John Simmons, Locke and the Right to Punish,
in Punishment 219, 250 (A. John Simmons et al. eds., 1995). Doctrines of criminal origin like
transferred intent that survived in tort law were regarded as fossils; see William L. Prosser,
Transferred Intent, 45 Texas L. Rev. 650 (1967). See also James B. Sales and Kenneth B. Cole, Jr.,
Punitive Damages: A Relic That Has Outlived Its Origins, 37 Vand. L. Rev. 1117 (1984).
(Vol. 56
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deterrence function. So it is that the vast bulk of scholarship has directed itself
to an assessment of punitives in light of its delivering the goods on compensation
and deterrence. Its goal of retribution was awkward, seeming rather primitive
and smacking of revenge."
Throughout the common law world, the keepers of the flame that punitive
damages had legitimate retributive purposes were some common law courts. The
flame, while exceedingly weak in England,' was only marginally more vital in
other common law jurisdictions. 3
The next section will sketch some underlying theories, but first it is
necessary to set forth the substantive rules that govern the award of punitive
damages, rules which I have argued are remarkably similar throughout the
common law world. The formulae all reveal a judicial desire to protect citizens
from arrogant abridgement of their rights.
IV. SUBSTANTIVE FORMULAE
The verbal formula requires the jury to determine that the defendant acted
in willful or reckless disregard of plaintiffs rights." The test usually demands
a subjective state of mind even though the action may be sounded in negli-
gence." The conduct must have been outrageous because of an "evil motive
or reckless indifference to the rights of others." Fourteen states require
41. Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., The Common Law 37-38 (1881) (regarding forms of liability
as survivals from more primitive times that should be reappraised). I thank my colleague John
Goldberg for this point.
42. The latest case in which the English courts have spoken about exemplary (punitive)
damages voices concern about their arbitrariness and potential for extraordinary quanta. Elton John
v. MGN Ltd., [1996] 2 All Eng. Rep. 35 (1995). Lord Justice Hirst, in the context of a defamation
action by singer Elton John, urged more stringent review of exemplary damages and recommended
that juries be apprised of comparable physical injury cases and that on appeal courts consider such
comparisons. He added:
(P]rinciple requires that an award of exemplary damages should never exceed the
minimum sum necessary to meet the public purpose underlying such damages, that of
punishing the defendant, showing that tort does not pay and deterring others.
43. In Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 19, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1044 (1991),
the United States Supreme Court says "punitive damages are imposed for the purposes of retribution
and deterrence," but engages in no robust defense of those goals. To steer too close to criminal
purposes hazards constitutional attack: John C. Jeffiies, Jr., A Comment on the Constitutionality of
Punitive Damages, 72 Va. L. Rev. 139 (1986); Calvin R. Massey, The Excessive Fines Clause and
Punitive Damages: Some Lessons from History, 40 Vand. L. Rev. 1233 (1987).
44. Gryc v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 297 N.W.2d 727 (Minn. 1980).
45. Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 908(2) (1979); Mark F. Grady, Punitive Damages and
Subjective States of Mind: A Positive Economic Theory, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 1197, 1220. Coloca v. B.P.
Australia Ltd. (1992) 2 V.R. 441.
46. Bumett v. Griffith, 769 S.W.2d 780, 789 (Mo. 1989). Conduct short of intentional
wrongdoing may be sufficient to justify punitive damages in some jurisdictions. Courts use a variety
of formulas to spell this out, including "reckless disregard for the rights of others," Allman v. Bird,
353 P.2d 216 (Kan. 1960); or "willful misconduct, wantonness, recklessness, or want of care
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malice, twenty-two conduct exceeding gross negligence, eight gross negligence,
and two have statutory requirements.47 In Australia, the court by long usage
requires proof of the defendant's "conscious wrongdoing in contumelious
disregard of another's rights."4" The formulae vary but at their heart is the idea
that a right is invoked, thus constituting, on the defendant's part, a theft-like
act. 9 As the United States Supreme Court has recognized, 0 the award of
punitive damages is highly discretionary. It invests much power, as previously
mentioned, in the jury. Due process is, however, not flouted if the jury is
appropriately charged and judicial and appellate review of the award is granted.
The highly discretionary nature of the punitive damage award is captured in
Commonwealth jurisprudence. The potential for largess has led to the restriction
of punitive damages in England. Elsewhere the courts have been concerned to
control the range of damages by reference that largess should not exceed awards
in excess of those garnered for compensation for devastating physical injuries."'
The absence of juries in most of these Commonwealth cases, except for
indicative of indifference to consequences," In re Air Crash Disaster Near Chicago, 644 F.2d 594 (7th
Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 878, 102 S. Ct. 358 (1981). Conduct that is merely negligent, even
if it causes severe damage, is insufficient to justify punitive damages. This is usually held to be true
of "grossly negligent" conduct when those terms are used as a synonym for "extreme carelessness"
as opposed to "recklessness." Compare Moore v. Wilson, 20 S.W.2d 310 (Ark. 1929), with
Williamson v. McKenna, 354 P.2d 56 (Or. 1960), suspersed by statute as stated in Winn v. Gilroy,
681 P.2d 776 (Or. 1984).
47. Currently, only four states, Michigan, Nebraska, New Hampshire, and Washington, do not
allow any type of punitive damage awards. However, Michigan and New Hampshire do allow "non-
economic compensatory damages" which may, in practice, be similar to punitive damages. Thirty-
two of the states that allow punitive damages recovery do not allow for the recovery of punitive
damages in cases of vicarious liability (or any derivative of such, like employer-employee liability).
In the 46 states which permit punitive damage recovery, there are four different "threshold" categories
of conduct which are required for punitive damages recovery. They are (1) malice (14 states) (most
difficult to prove); (2) conduct exceeding gross negligence but not constituting malice (24 states); (3)
gross negligence (6 states); and (4) various statutory requirements (2 states) (usually easiest to prove).
Richard L. Blatt et al., Punitive Damages, A State by State Guide to Law and Practice § 3.2 (1991
& Supp. 1993).
48. Whitfield v. DeLauret & Co., 29 C.L.R. 71,77 (1920), as Justice Windeyer in Uren v. John
Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd., 117 C.L.R. 118, 154 (1966), points out, the phrase is of long usage,
stemming back to the first edition of Salmond on Torts, 102. See also XL Petroleum v. Caltex Oil,
155 C.L.R. 448, 471 (1985) (Brennan, J.).
49. David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Punitive Damages, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 705, 720
(1989) (hereinafter Moral Foundations]; David G. Owen, Civil Punishment and Public Good, 56 S.
Cal. L. Rev., 103, 110-11 (1982) [hereinafter Civil Punishment].
50. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 18, 111 S. Ct. 1032, 1043 (1991) (noting
the impossibility and undesirability of drawing "a mathematically bright line between the
constitutionally acceptable and the constitutionally unacceptable that would fit every case").
51. Carson v. John Fairfax & Sons, 178 C.L.R. 44 (1993) (the majority in discussing the
vindicatory nature of damages for defamation accept that a court reviewing the jury award may have
regard to disabling physical injury cases in judging reasonableness. Consistent with this the trial
judge may indicate to the jury the ordinary level of the general damages component of personal
injuries awards. Justice Brennan, now Chief Justice, filed a trenchant dissent.).
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defamation, may protect against jury unruliness obviating some of the procedural
protections found vital by the United States Supreme Court.
52
In the common law jurisdictions, punitive damages have survived the
"decriminalization" of criminal law,53 the concern of courts for certainty in legal
rules, the bent of lawyer-economists to view torts through the lens of optimal
deterrence, and the entreaties of those who would promote compensation as the
sole purpose.54
The Commonwealth courts at the end of the Nineteenth Century repudiated
the notion that wrongful motive alone could render a lawful act tortious. 5" The
American courts maintained the subjective wrong notion;' indeed, Oliver
Wendell Holmes opined that no civilized system of law could avoid the
imposition of liability for an act designed to cause harm without justification."
With their faces set against the gauging of liability via the subjective intent, it
would have been a short step for the Commonwealth courts to abolish punitive
damages. Yet this was not done. The reason is the strong reaction against
intentionally malicious tortious action. Just as fault has persisted as the
foundation for tort liability, a sense has been maintained that an arrogant flouting
of rights deserves censure by the courts. In the many formulations for the award
of punitive damages, a strong core is apparent that very bad behavior will not be
tolerated. Rights of citizens should be closely guarded against consciously
arrogant abridgement. As stated previously, that punitive damages should have
been preserved in these adverse conditions, gives good reason to believe that in
a legal culture of rights protection, as found in the United States, they should
flourish.
52. Atiyah & Summers, supra note 1, at 169-77, and see Louis Kaplow, The Value ofAccuracy
in Adjudication: An Economic Analysis, 23 J. Legal Stud. 307, 329 (1994) (jury determinations are
"black-box" pronouncements generating little information for future guidance). This is not to say that
judges rather than juries are superior decision-makers in any one case; empirical work shows that
juries are not more pro-plaintiff or generous across the board of tort cases. Kevin M. Clermont &
Theodore Eisenberg, Trial By Jury or Judge: Transcending Empiricism, 77 Cornell L. Rev. 1124
(1992). The usual argument by commentators has been that jury unruliness needs to be constrained.
David Owen, Punitive Damages in Products Liability Litigation, 74 Mich. L. Rev. 1257 (1976)
[hereinafter Punitive Damages], urges that the judge be given more power, see also Ellis, supra note
6, at 59 (arguing the need to reduce uncertainty).
53. Hans Stoll, Penal Purposes in the Law of Tort, 18 Am. J. Comp. L. 3 (1970).
54. In England punitive damages have been embattled because the dominant philsophy is one
of compensation, but even so the English law commission discussion paper is sympathetic to
releasing punitives from the straitacket of Rookes v. Barnard, 1964 App. Cas. 1129. Cf Kronman,
supra note 37, at 87, empowering the community to make decisions about the public good.
55. Lord Justice Bowen in Mogul S.S. Co. Ltd. v. McGregor, Gow & Co., 23 Q.B.D. 598, 613
(1889), suggested that a motive to hurt makes an action wrongful. But Lord Herscbell soon
squelched this notion in Allen v. Flood, 1898 App. Cas. 1, 139-40 (1897).
56. The leading American case is Tuttle v. Buck, 107 Minn. 145, 119 N.W. 946 (1909).
57. Aikens v. Wisconsin, 195 U.S. 194, 25 S. Ct. 3 (1904); Oliver W. Holmes, Jr., Privilege,
Malice and Intent, 8 Harv. L. Rev. 1 (1894); J.B. Ames, How Far An Act May Be a Tort Because
of the Wrongful Motive of the Actor, 18 Hay. L. Rev. 411 (1905).
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V. THE SEARCH FOR A RATIONALE
A. A Grab-Bag of Reasons
The courts have shown a good deal of wisdom to resist academic categoriza-
tions urging singular normative bases for punitive damages. The term "punitive
damages," when unpacked, will have been seen as having many purposes. This
article, like most others, takes one purpose and explicates it in some detail. But
I make no claim that this is a sole purpose or that it is the most important;
although, I do claim it has considerable explanatory and normative force. So
amoeba-like are punitive damages that I fear most of us in legal academe have
been unduly procrustean in pressing our theories upon the old venerable remedy.
Like the common law, and a teenager's room, punitive damages are untidy and
defy the work of academic neatniks. In this essay I make an argument that,
historically and theoretically, the function of punitive damages can be understood
by viewing its invitation to the jury to apply an open-textured rule. Within a
system with republican roots the jury plays an integral part. But I want to stress
that my argument is not exclusive. The work of many scholars has shed light
on the function and role of punitive damages. I discuss below much of the work
that has proceeded from the deterrence model of tort liability rules.
In a seminal article, Dean Ellis proposes, in Biblical allusion, seven purposes
gleaned from judicial opinions and the writings of commentators: "(1) punishing
the defendant; (2) deterring the defendant from repeating the offense; (3)
deterring others from committing an offense; (4) preserving the peace; (5)
inducing private law enforcement; (6) compensating victims for otherwise
uncompensable losses; and (7) paying the plaintiff's attorneys' fees." 'SS
These seven purposes can be organized conceptually under three rubrics: the
compensation rationale, the deterrence rationale, and the retributive rationale.s9
Professors Chapman and Trebilcock adopt these rubrics and engage in an
instructive discussion of the fit of the rationales with the doctrinal law developed
by the courts. They examine the first order issues of proscribed conduct and
quantum of damages under each rubric and turn to second order issues of
vicarious liability, insurability, the relevance of wealth, and procedural
protections.' This pattern of analysis follows a well-trodden path. A rationale
is selected and a detailed examination is made to ascertain consistency. Usually
the fit is ill. Accordingly, recommendations are made to pull the law into
line-to make the fit good."'
58. Ellis, supra note 6, at 3.
59. This is the division adopted by Bruce Chapman and Michael Trebilcock, Punitive Damages:
Divergence in Search of a Rationale, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 741, 761, 779, 805 (1989).
60. Id. at 761-825.
61. Izhak Englard, The Philosophy of Tort Law 153 (1993) (arguing that at a normative level
the scholarly reform proposals reflect the monistic or pluralistic conception of the underlying tort
theory).
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Some commentators, of whom David Owen is the most outstanding, propose
a much more complex moral basis for the law. Owen draws on ideas of
freedom, truth, equality, and community in laying down formulations of the
law.62 Those foundations inform morally the purposes and the limits of
punitive damages. Owen's important insight is the appropriate use of punitive
damages for "serious abuses of power."' 3
Other schools of legal thinking have eschewed such analysis but invite a
wider "non-liberal" perspective. As Angela Harris has stated:
In liberal theory, there is no single moral good for a community; values
are idiosyncratic and heterogeneous.... The doctrine of punitive
damages starts from a different premise: that certain values, in this case
the rules of deference and demeanor necessary for social interaction,
and therefore for the constitution of personality, are both collective and
internalized. Thus, the legal principles that draw upon these rules can
be contextualized and particular rather than abstract."
This communitarian reasoning leads to an emphasis on the social role of the
jury. The jury is the vehicle for voicing conventional morality.6 5 The central
and appropriate role of the jury has been pressed by others."6
With this eclectic backdrop the drama of punitive damages is sure to have
a long life on the nation's law review pages. The struggle to clarify the
foundations of punitive damages may often seem sysiphean. My contribution is
not an account that ploughs a new furrow, but, rather, builds on the work of the
above commentators. It confirms the wisdom of most courts in their adherence
to traditional doctrine.
B. Compensation and Remedial Gap-Filling
The circumstances of the tort may be such as to require greater damages
than to replace actual palpable losses. The victim may suffer losses that cannot
be measured by out-of-pocket losses. The injury itself may cause non-economic
loss including pain and suffering and loss of enjoyment of life.6' The circun-
62. David G. Owen, The Moral Foundations of Products Liability Law: Toward First
Principles, 68 Notre Dame L. Rev. 427 (1993).
63. Owen, Moral Foundations, supra note 49, at 718.
64. Angela P. Harris, Rereading Punitive Damages: Beyond the Public/Private Distinction, 40
Ala. L. Rev. 1079, 1109 (1989). This atomistic description of liberal theory has been attacked as a
caricature, Stephen Holmes, The Anatomy of Antiliberalism (1993).
65. Wojciech Sadurski, Conventional Morality and Judicial Standards, 73 Va. L. Rev. 339
(1987).
66. Alan H. Scheiner, Judicial Assessment of Punitive Damages, The Seventh Amendment, and
the Politics of Jury Power, 91 Col. L. Rev. 142 (1991).
67. Jeffrey O'Connell & Keith Carpenter, Payment for Pain and Suffering through History, 50
Ins. Couns. J. 411 (1983); McDougald v. Garber, 73 N.Y.2d 246, 536 N.E.2d 372 (1989) (discussing
loss of enjoyment of life).
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stances of the tort may aggravate the victim's injury. A dignatory interest may
be at stake, where for example a person is subjected to a racial epithet.s A
relationship may be torn where a psychiatrist has sexual intercourse with his
patient.69 In each of these instances some actual losses may be suffered but the
bulk in outrage and the damages can be said to compensate for that outrage. 70
In English law these damages have been separated from exemplary damages.7
Only a small part of punitive damages are represented by aggravated
damages. The utility and practicality of the division has been doubted.72 The
distinction has not surfaced so strongly in American jurisprudence, although if
law reform measures restricting punitive damages continue to proliferate, the
litigation bar will no doubt press that "aggravated damages," compensatory in
nature, are distinct and separate and do not fall within the punitive restrictions.73
Recognition of the division between punitive and aggravated damages prompts
the insight that the term "punitive damages" is multidimensional.
Litigation costs may be encompassed in an award of punitive damages.7'
Elsewhere, intangible losses are enfolded into damages recovery. Wrongful
death damages are an example. Under Lord Campbell's Act, the grandfather of
all wrongful death statutes, the damages were strictly confined to economic loss
sustained on the death of the relative. 5 But with prevailing notions of
compensation and deterrence this was an inadequate remedy. "It is better to kill
than maim" was not a motto to commend itself to a principled body of law.
68. Fisher v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627 (Tex. 1967).
69. Barry Nurcombe & David F. Partlett, Child Mental Health and the Law 241-42 (1994).
70. Tom Allen, Civil Liability for Sexual Exploitation in Professional Relationships, 59 Mod.
L. Rev. 56 (1996).
71. Rookes v. Barnard, 1964 App. Cas. 1129.
72. See Julius Stone, Double Count and Double Talk: The End of Exemplary Damages?, 46
Austl. L.J. 311 (1972). Windeyer J. in Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons Pty. Ltd., 117 C.L.R. 118, 152
(1966), doubted that the "labels" "aggravated" and "exemplary" denoted damages really different in
effect; in preserving the distinction he opined that "we shall sometimes find ourselves dealing more
in words than ideas." Id.
73. For a recent discussion see Michael Blanton, Aggravating Circumstance Dangers and the
Process Due: Implications of the Missouri Supreme Court's Decision in Bennett v. Owens-Corning
Fiberglas Corp., 64 U.M.K.C. L. Rev. 261 (1995). Reformers in this area are intent upon abolition
of punitive damages and should therefore be aware of the argument that aggravated compensatory
damages are not punitive. Law reformers in New Zealand face the opposite result where the
compensation scheme abolished tort liability for personal injuries. In Donselaar v. Donselaar, [1982]
1 N.Z.L.R. 97, the New Zealand Court of Appeals (the highest court in New Zealand) construed this
to abolish actions for compensatory damages but to leave on foot actions for exemplary damages.
The United States Supreme Court in Molzofv. United States, 112 S. Ct. 711 (1992), defined the term
"punitive damages" as employed by the United States Torts Claims Act finding that pain and
suffering were not included with "punitive" damages.
74. Charles T. McCormick, Handbook on the Law of Damages 277 (1935). In Connecticut,
exemplary damages are restricted to the cost of litigation. Craney v. Donovan, 102 A. 640 (Conn.
1917).
75. T. A. Smedley, Wrongful Death-Basis of the Common Law Rules, 13 Vand. L. Rev. 605
(1960).
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Thus courts and legislatures moved to allow further damages for intangible losses
suffered on the death of a family member.76 The Scots, belying their reputa-
tion, early created the solatium payment, elsewhere damages for loss of
companionship and grief were allowed." These damages are given in the face
of proscription against punitive damages, or, where punitives are permitted, the
same compensatory elements may be folded into punitive damages."8
Punitive damages are a valuable weapon where remedies are limited and
social policy frustrated. For example, the courts have developed tort remedies
to secure and maintain long-term relational contracts in the torts of inducement
to breach of contract79 and bad-faith breach of contract., Conventional
measures of damages for breach of contract do not capture the relational interests
at stake. The possibility of punitive damages provides a more satisfactory
mechanism.8" In these categories punitive damages are employed to fill the
gaps in available remedies. It is unfortunate that the law has been content to
invoke the use of the term "punitive damages" for gap filling and for the wider
"quasi-criminal law" functions to be discussed in the bulk of this paper. A
proper appreciation that the function is to compensate better or to avoid
breakdowns in agency relationships may allow a nuanced development of
punitive damages in this sphere. 2
C. Deterrence: Law and Economics
Deterrence is probably the most universal rationale. 3 The courts often refer
to deterrence in terms of making the wrongdoer smart. The penalty is directly
76. Smith v. Detroit, 202 N.W.2d 300 (Mich. 1972). Fla. Stat. Ann. § 768.21.
77. John Fairfax & Sons Ltd. v. Kelly, 8 N.S.W. L. Rep. 131, 138 (1987).
78. Stuart M. Speiser et al., Recovery for Wrongful Death and Injury § 3.4 (3d ed. 1992).
79. Lumley v. Gye, 2 El. & Bl. 216, 118 Eng. Rep. 749 (Q.B. 1853).
80. The tort has been mainly confined to the insurance contract: see Foley v. Interactive Data
Corporation, 765 P.2d 373 (Cal. 1988) (refusing to extend the tort beyond insurance, to wrongful
dismissal). In Freeman & Mills, Inc. v. Belcher Oil Company, 900 P.2d 669 (Cal. 1995), the Court
confined the tort to insurance, rejecting the tort of bad-faith denial of contracts.
81. David F. Partlett, From Victorian Opera to Rock and Rap: Inducement to Breach of
Contract in the Music Industry, 66 Tul. L. Rev. 771 (1992); John A. Sebert, Jr., Pecuniary and Non-
Pecuniary Damages in Actions Based Upon Contract: Toward Achieving the Objective of Full
Compensation, 33 U.C.L.A. L. Rev. 1565 (1986).
82. A discussion of the gap.filling function of punitive damages requires a separate paper.
However, the distinction ought to be made. The categories may overlap as with bad-faith breach of
insurance contracts, where both the quality of the act is reprehensible and the relationship is one that
requires the support of remedies beyond contractual damages. Punitive damages are often
recoverable. A few of a large number are: Travelers Ins. Co. v. Savio, 706 P.2d 1258 (Colo. 1985);
Southern United Life Ins. Co. v. Caves, 481 So. 2d 764 (Miss. 1985); Jackson Nat. Life Ins. Co. v.
Receconi, 827 P.2d 118 (N.M. 1992); Kizziah v. Golden Rule Ins. Co., 536 So. 2d 943 (Ala. 1988);
Sere v. Group Hospitalization, Inc., 443 A.2d 33 (D.C. App. 1982).
83. Robert D. Cooter, Punitive Damages for Deterrence: When and How Much?, 40 Ala. L.
Rev. 1143, 1146 (1989).
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targeted toward the wrongful act. This is specific deterrence. Of greater moment
is general deterrence. The imposition of punitive damages will influence the price
of the activity thus reducing its incidence to an optimal level. Alternatively, safer
substitutes may be encouraged, or greater care taken to avoid accidents.8 ' The
ideal of general deterrence is well-established in tort jurisprudence. 5 Why are
super-compensatory damages required? In some contexts, the utility attained by
the defendant in an activity outweighs the compensatory damages. For example,
too few victims may initiate litigation to bring home to the defendant the full social
costs of the activity. 6 Harms may not always be easily traceable to tortious
activity, and thus not fall to be priced by the tort system. Litigation costs may be
high. 7 This may be an especial problem where the harm is intentionally unlawful
and will be more consciously disguised. Intentional misconduct signals that the
derived benefit to the actor will considerably outweigh the victim's costs. Punitive
damages may be made in order to ferret out these wrongful acts. Plaintiffs and
their attorneys are provided an incentive to engage in an expensive search in hopes
of obtaining a super-compensatory award. In formal terms, Cooter justifies
punitive damages by stating that in their absence "enforcement errors [would]
enable injurers to externalize a portion of expected social costs that they cause.""
Thus, punitive damages should be set in order to deter at the level that "eliminates
the advantage of noncompliance and forces potential injurers to internalize the
expected social costs of their actions."89 Without punitive damages, the incentives
to conform to the law are inadequate."
Other theorists have proposed that punitive damages may be assigned a more
pervasive function. Jason Johnston has recognized the barriers to efficiency in the
tort system-litigation costs and uncertainty. He recommends a "properly
safeguarded" regime of punitive damages in order to overcome those barriers and
to create "optimal incentives for choosing investments in safety."' Johnston's
recommendations that pair punitive liability with strict liability for economic loss
would both punish and induce optimal deterrence.92 Others of the same school
have conceived of punitive damages as sustaining an efficient property rights
regime by encouraging in thin markets exchange rather than expropriation. 3
84. The dichotomy was first developed by Guido Calabresi, The Costs of Accidents: A Legal
and Economic Analysis (1970).
85. William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economic Structure of Tort Law 2-24 (1987).
86. Dan B. Dobbs, Ending Punishment in "Punitive" Damages: Deterrence-Measured
Remedies, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 831, 857 (1989); Ellis, supra note 6, at 24.
87. Dobbs, supra note 86, at 857.
88. Cooter, supra note 83, at 1148.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 1194.
91. Jason S. Johnston, Punitive Liability: A New Paradigm of Efficiency in Tort Law, 87
Colum. L. Rev. 1385, 1389 (1987).
92. Id. at 1438.
93. David D. Haddock et al., An Ordinary Economic Rationale for Extraordinary Legal
Sanctions, 78 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1990).
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Professor Galligan94 proposes an argument that draws on the same economic
analysis. It shares an affinity with the gap-filling compensation just-presented
argument that punitive damages may be given to more adequately compensate.
Professor Galligan proposes that punitive damages-or augmented damages-are
given to generally deter harm-producing activities. He points out that the law does
not extend liability in numbers of contexts, such as for negligently caused pure
economic loss.9 5 The law may refuse to accord direct redress for these wrongs
because of the administrative burden or costs so entailed. This implies a shortfall
in the quotient of damages necessary to deter generally these wrongful acts. The
augmented award allows the shortfall to be made up; the plaintiff and the
augmented damages are acting as a proxy to achieve the correct costing of harmful
activities. 6
The economic analysis literature is extensive and dominant. In the important
collection of papers in the Alabama Law Review,97 the majority of scholars took
a strongly economic view of the operation of punitive damages.98
The description of tort law and criminal law as an engine of deterrence is
powerful. For tort lawyers the multitude of tort rules could be analyzed with the
tools of economics. The pressure to reduce social costs of interactions led to a
search to place liability on the least cost avoider. For criminal lawyers deterrence
explains why society should punish wrongdoers. Nevertheless, the deterrence
rationale has a weakness born of its utilitarian roots." An effective deterrence
regime has nothing to do with responsibility of the individual. It may be, for
example, that deterrence would be better effected by resort to collective responsibil-
ity. This may inevitably catch the innocent, but so be it. Immediately the utilitarian
horrible is conjured up. To save a township, it may be necessary to kill an
identified but innocent individual. The utilitarian jumps at the opportunity to save
the township.'" By this step he will increase the quotient of happiness. In the
criminal setting, moreover, the deterrence model allows the cruel punishment. If
94. Thomas C. Galligan, Jr., Augmented Awards: The Efficient Evolution of Punitive Damages,
51 La. L. Rev. 3 (1990).
95. Id. at 44-52.
96. Id. at 84.
97. Symposium: Punitive Damages, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 687 (1989).
98. Chapman and Trebilcock, supra note 59; Dobbs, supra note 86; Malcolm E. Wheeler, A
Proposalfor Further Common Law Development of the Use of Punitive Damages In Modern Product
Liability Litigation, id. at 919; Ellis, supra note 6; George L. Priest, Insurability and Punitive
Damages, id. at 1009; David Friedman, An Economic Explanation of Punitive Damages, id at 1125;
Cooter, supra note 83; Mark F. Grady, Punitive Damages and Subjective States of Mind: A Positive
Economic Theory, id. at 1197; E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate
Misconduct Effectively, id. at 1053. Dobbs is not usually regarded as a lawyer-economist, but in this
paper he takes a strong deterrence line. As discussed above, the articles of Owen, Moral
Foundations, supra note 49, and Angela Harris, supra note 64, eschew this analysis for moral and
communitarian bases respectively.
99. Ronald Dworkin, Why Efficiency?, 8 Hofstra L. Rev. 563 (1980); Ronald Dworkin, Law's
Empire 288-95 (1986).
100. J.J.C. Smart & Bernard Williams, Utilitarianism For and Against 67-73 (1973).
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shoplifters could be optimally deterred by the death penalty, and happiness
improved thereby, no reason could be leveled against the exaction of the penal-
ty. 1 The path of modem tort law has trodden close to accepting a deterrence
model. In the DES cases the form of liability tracks responsibility for creating risk
of injury.'02 The movement in mass tort adjudication has been away from
adherence to the causation link that tort law traditionally required. 3
The deterrence rationale requires responsibility only in the sense that those
who may control producing activities will be faced with incentives to take due care.
Thus one could hold an innocent liable provided that the party responsible would
thus be encouraged to internalize the costs of his activities.'04 In the punitive
damages sphere the mechanism will encourage the attorney as bounty hunter to root
out such costly behavior bringing parties to book, thus creating infuturo incentives
to avoid the behavior. The working of this deterrence system is, however, arthritic.
It requires a coordination between client and attorney that is not found in fact. The
private interests of the attorney do not align with that of the claimant. The private
interests of attorney and claimant do not always reflect the public interest.0 5 For
101. Id. (admitting the dilemma but indicating that the event would be sufficiently rare not to
sway either an act utilitarian or a rule utilitarian).
102. Sindell v. Abbott Laboratories, 607 P.2d 924 (Cal.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 912, 101 S. Ct.
285 (1980) (espousing a market share rule); Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly & Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y.
1989) (employing market share rule on a national basis without excuse for proof that drug could not
have caused actual injury).
103. Cf. John G. Fleming, Mass Torts, 42 Am. J. Comp. L. 507 (1994) (highlighting the
American courts' commitment to bestowing remedies in mass tort contexts). Mass tort litigation has
created tensions between traditional common law dispute resolution and litigation control in mass
torts. See Kenneth S. Abraham, Individual Action and Collective Responsibility: The Dilemma of
Mass Tort Reform, 73 Va. L. Rev. 845 (1987); Kenneth S. Abraham & Lance Liebman, Private
Insurance, Social Insurance, and Tort Reform: Toward a New Vision of Compensation for Illness
and Injury, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 75 (1993); Deborah R. Hensler, Resolving Mass Toxic Torts: Myths
and Realities, 1989 U. Ill. L. Rev. 89 (1989); Jay Tidmarsh, Unattainable Justice: The Form of
Complex Litigation and the Limits of Judicial Power, 60 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 1683 (1992). Cf. Glen
Donath, Comment, Curing Cancerphobia Phobia, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1113 (canvassing the cases and
suggesting a rule allowing recovery on the basis of substantial probability). This should be
distinguished from the damages problem of establishing certainty with respect to future injuries,
which are argued to be the possible result of present injuries. See Pollock v. Johns-Manville Sales
Corp., 686 F. Supp. 489 (D.N.J. 1988); Mauro v. Raymark Industries, Inc., 561 A.2d 257, 260 (NJ.
1989). More widely, mass tort litigation has demanded innovation in awarding damages on an
aggregate rather than case-by-case basis; see Michael J. Saks & Peter David Blanck, Justice
Improved: The Unrecognized Benefits of Aggregation and Sampling in the Trial of Mass Torts, 44
Stan. L. Rev. 815 (1992); Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S. Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law,
78 Va. L. Rev. 148, 1 (1992).
104. The explanation for vicarious liability, see Alan Sykes, The Economics of Vicarious
Liability, 93 Yale L.J. 1231 (1984). See also Saul Levmore, Gomorrah to Ybarra and More:
Overextraction and the Puzzle of Immoderate Group Liability, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1561 (1995) (exploring
the limits of overextraction).
105. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the Courts, 105
Hare. L. Rev. 427 (1991) (discussing the conflict between confidentiality and public access to
information produced in litigation).
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example, both the attorney and claimant may find it advantageous to settle a claim
expeditiously. The attendant confidentiality frustrates the law's efficiency purpose
to foster the disclosure of information. Furthermore, depending on the attorney's
fee structure, she will have an interest in early settlement of the claim to avoid the
unreasonable expenses of pressing the claim to court."° The claimant's interest
may be otherwise. The potential conflict is greater if we allow that claimants often
have non-financial reasons for pressing claims, which are foregone when settlement
is reached by the attorney.
The deterrent effects of punitives on corporations are difficult to discern. In
the presence of insurance to cover the risk"0 7 of punitive damages and in light of
the diffused impact on product design, deterrence must be a most inaccurate and
uncertain goal. The information forcing function of punitive damages may also be
confounded. In face of punitive damages company officers may adopt strategies
that inhibit the revelation of product safety information. An entire industry may
hunker down when threatened by litigation.' °8
None of these oft-repeated arguments are a fatal blow against the deterrence
rationale. Imperfection is conceded by deterrence theorists. Their agenda is toward
a system that faces the inherent imperfections and recommends redress. However,
these theorists must concede that if another system of equal or better deterrent
effect could be devised without the heavy transaction costs of tort law, we should
embrace it. Perhaps one could look to a scheme which combines regulation and
governmental compensation."° The persistence of punitive damages demon-
strates that deterrence is but part of the rationale. The reason tort law lingers with
its heavy transaction costs is its essential role in social cohesion and individual
responsibility."' It is the backwards review of responsibility, rather than the
creation of incentives for due care, that explains the persistence of punitive
damages.
106. Geoffrey P. Miller, Some Agency Problems in Settlement, 16 J. of Leg. Stud. 189 (1987).
For a discussion see Frank A. Sloan, et al., Suing for Medical Malpractice 83 (1993).
107. Priest, supra note 98; Ellis, supra note 6, at 71-76 (alluding to the practice and effect of
permitting insurance cover).
108. Cf. John P. Burns et al., Special Project-Analysis of the Legal, Social, and Political Issues
Raised by Asbestos Litigation, 36 Vand. L. Rev. 573 (1983) (pointing to the impediments in asbestos
litigation); Barry I. Castleman, Asbestos: Medical and Legal Aspects (2d ed. 1986). The tobacco
industry is notorious in its united front against liability suits. Robert L. Rabin, A Sociolegal History
of the Tobacco Tort Litigation, 44 Stan. L. Rev. 853, 858 (describing the cigarette companies
"intransigence"). This is exemplified by the reaction to Liggett's settlement in a class action suit on
behalf of smokers and five state Medicaid suits: A Fork in Tobacco Road, Time Magazine, March
25, 1996, at 47 (describing the settlement as a "seismic shift").
109. Kip Viscusi, Toward a Diminished Role for Tort Liability: Social Insurance, Government
Regulation, and Contemporary Risks to Health and Safety, 6 Yale J. on Reg. 65 (1989); Paul C.
Weiler, Medical Malpractice on Trial (1991); Stephen D. Sugarman, Doing Away with Personal
Injury Law (1989).
110. Owen, supra note 62.
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D. Retribution and the Moral Core of Tort Law
Persons may not arrogantly invade the rights of others even where that may
be efficient. A rights boundary is maintained. Rights cannot be traded unless
the rights possessor consents to the trade."' A forced trade is wrong not
because it is inefficient (though it often is) but because it flouts a moral precept.
The right needs to be explained in this way lest the individual right be regarded
merely as an article of trade. I assign the right a functional or consequential
role. It is to fit our relationships into a society which is marked by social peace
and cohesion and full and equal citizens' participation. We proscribe the ability
to sell ourselves or others into slavery, not because it is inefficient but because
to allow such trades diminishes our dignity to be treated as equals."' Norms
reflecting equality and maintaining rights attract general social compliance."'
Most people, most of the time, live by rules that respect rights. These rules are
adhered to not because of the fear of punishment but because consciously to flout
them is simply abhorrent."'
The punitive damages rules spring from the social roots of the law. The law
symbolized what correct relationships were between citizens. The law promoted
participation and dialogue, the measure of equal citizenship. Behavior which
intentionally and consciously invades rights deserves censure. We have usually
delegated that censure to the state in the enforcement of criminal law."' Fear
of overreaching by private enforcement is ever present. However, where
enforcement is the monopoly of the state, want of zeal, cumbrousness, or
conflicting interests immediately are of concern." 6 Here our society has opted
for a combination of enforcement of mechanisms.
111. Haddock et al., supra note 93; Cooter, supra note 83. The exceptions to this principle
represent challenges to doctrine and philosophical fit. Cf Vincent v. Lake Erie Transp. Co., 124
N.W. 221 (Minn. 1910); Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 257 N.E.2d 870 (N.Y. 1970), have attracted
the attention of economists and moral philosophers. See Judith Jarvis Thomson, Rights, Restitution,
and Risk: Essays in Moral Theory 203-07 (1986).
112. Ronald M. Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously 180 (1977) (explicating the right to equal
concern and respect in Rawls' theory).
113. See H.L.A. Hart's socially based rules of recognition. H.L.A. Hart, The Concept of Law
97-107 (1961). This may be conceptualized in terms of maximizing "mutual expected advantage,"
Postema, supra note 34, at 108 (discussing David Hume's idea of justice as the product of redirected
self-interest); the game theorists unsurprisingly arrive at the same conclusion in seeing that social
rules may evolve to tailor co-operative behavior: Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation
(1984).
114. "People comply with the law most of the time not through fear of punishment, or even fear
of shaming, but because criminal behavior is simply abhorrent to them.... Shaming... is critical
to understanding why most serious crime is unthinkable to most of us." John Braithwaite, Crime,
shame, and reintegration 71 (1989).
115. A. John Simmons, Locke and the Right to Punish, in Punishment 219, 234-35 (A. John
Simmons et. al eds., 1995) (arguing that the power is delegated to the state under a Lockean
contract).
116. Chapman & Trebilcock, supra note 59, at 787.
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In this paper I support a version of retribution as the appropriate rationale
in most cases.' 1 7  It is the rationale that is most unsettling for tort lawyers
because they are steeped in notions of compensation and deterrence as
appropriate goals in tort law. Criminal law is generally viewed as the law's
weapon in obtaining retribution for a person wronged by an antisocial act.
Retribution seems hard-edged and unforgiving for the tort scholar where constant
adjustment in relationships demands flexible rules." '8 But criminal law may
be incomplete in mapping the circumstances where retribution is necessary." '9
The code of criminal law does not encompass all those acts that may be
described as so heinous as to devalue the victim, robbing her of her equal value
as a citizen. Enforcement by a grant of punitive damages accords equality to the
victim and enforces a norm that in this transaction she is treated, albeit by ex
post facto determination, as being of equal worth.'2 Thus, the private push for
retribution is satisfied. The magnitude of the punishment is a measure of the
inequality spoken to by the wrongdoing. The heinousness of the act expresses
contempt by the wrongdoer for the victim's value.' 2' As Galanter and Luban
argue, this fits nicely with the historical rationale of punitive damages. It
emphasizes "affronts to the honor of the victim."'2 In exulting retribution, at
one level or another, the forward-looking rationale of deterrence is also
promoted.'23
The law gives vent to the private interest in retribution, to accord the
wrongdoer his just deserts, for a social or public reason. It is to solidify those
norms which maximize participation and full citizenship. In criminal law theory
retribution has been revivified because of the abject failure of deterrence and
rehabilitation as rationales for punishment. 24 It accords with restored ideals
of responsibility and a shift against a calculus that treats individuals as a means
to an end.'25
As singular rationales, compensation and deterrence were found wanting.
As a singular rationale, retribution is also far from satisfactory. Yet, it is the
117. It is often joined with deterrence. See Marc Galanter & David Luban, Poetic Justice:
Punitive Damages and Legal Pluralism, 42 Am. U. L. Rev. 1393, 1435 (1993).
118. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Inalienabili-
ty: One View of the Cathedral, 85 Harv. L. Rev. 1089 (1972).
119. Galanter & Luban, supra note 117, at 1440.
120. Jean Hampton, Correcting Harms Versus Righting Wrongs: The Goal of Retribution, 39
UCLA L. Rev. 1659, 1685-86 (1992).
121. Id. For a discussion of Hampton's view see Galanter & Luban, supra note 117, at 1433.
122. Ellis, supra note 6, at 15-17; Galanter & Luban, supra note 117, at 1433.
123. Jane Mallor & Barry Roberts, Punitive Damages: Toward a Principled Approach, 31
Hastings L.J. 639, 648 (1980) (arguing the inseparability of deterrence and retribution). In criminal
law the deterrence or preventative rationale has been much debated. See Deterrence and
Incapacitation (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978); Franklin Zimring & Gordon J. Hawkins,
Deterrence (1973); Jack P. Gibbs, Crime, Punishment, and Deterrence (1975).
124. Francis T. Cullen & Karen E. Gilbert, Reaffirming Rehabilitation (1982).
125. Hugo A. Bedau, Retribution and the Theory of Punishment, 75 J. of Philos. 601 (1978).
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beginning of a theory that justifies punitive damages in tort, and for that reason
I will dwell a little more on the shortcomings.
E. Some Reflections on Retribution and Punitive Damages
Three issues should be framed on retributive theory: why exact punishment;
who should suffer punishment; and what should be the degree of punish-
ment. 2 6  If we take the first, some theorists argue that there is an extrinsic
good in the wrongdoer's suffering.' In these terms retribution, the exacting
of just deserts, is a primitive, a good in itself without reference to its conse-
quences. This proposition is a conversation stopper. But it is hard to see why
retribution should be a base value.' Another approach is more nuanced. It
argues for a rebalancing between wrongdoer and victim. As Ashworth says: "It
is unfair that the offender should be allowed to 'get away with' that advantage,
and it is therefore right that he should be subjected to a disadvantage so as to
cancel out (at least symbolically) his ill-gotten gain."'29  This account is
troublesome because burdens and advantages are not evenly distributed according
to victim and wrongdoer status. Although inflexible criminal sanctions may be
inadequate in adjustment, an advantage of punitive damages is their adaptability
in the event of varying burdens and advantages. Hence, the Ashworth rationale
may hold for punitives in more situations than state-imposed sanctions. For
example, courts generally take account of defendant's wealth in awarding
damages. 3
Another theory proposes another basis for retributive punishment. It is that
punishment annuls the wrong done and returns matters to their status quo.' 3'
In a version adapted as persuasive by Luban and Galanter, this is taken up by
126. H. L. A. Hart's definition asserts three things:
first, that a person may be punished if, and only if, he has voluntarily done something
morally wrong; secondly, that his punishment must in some way match, or be the
equivalent of, the wickedness of his offence; and thirdly, that the justification for
punishing men under such conditions is that the return of suffering for moral evil
voluntary done, is itself just or morally good.
H. L. A. Hart, Punishment and Responsibility 231 (1968).
127. Ted Honderich, Punishment: The Supposed Justifications 212 (1984).
128.. Cf Johnston, supra 91, at 1430, asserting the non-consequentialist basis of retribution as
described by John Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, 64 Phil. Rev. 3, 4-5 (1955).
129. Andrew Ashworth, Sentencing and Penal Policy 18 (1983). See also Wojciech Sadurski,
Giving Desert Its Due 225 (1985); Herbert Morris, Persons and Punishment, 52 The Monist 476
(1968); Jeffrie G. Murphy, Retribution, Justice, and Therapy (1979); John Finnis, Natural Law and
Natural Rights (1980).
130. Coats v. Constr. & Gen. Laborers Local #185, 93 Cal. Rptr. 639 (1971); Adams v.
Murakami, 813 P:2d 1348 (Cal, 1991). Two defendants may engage in equally culpable actions but
may, on the basis of wealth, be subjected to different punitive damages. Joab, Inc. v. Thrall, 245 So.
2d 291 (Fla. App. 1971). Stephen E. Woodbury, Limiting Discovery of a Defendant's Wealth When
Punitive Damages are Alleged, 23 Duquesne L. Rev. 349 (1984).
131. G. W. Hegel, Philosophy of Right (T.M. Knox trans., 1952).
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Jean Hampton. Punishment cannot annul the act; rather, punishment defeats the
wrongdoing that asserted mastery over the victim. Punishment now is a reverse
act of mastery.' This has been criticized as assuming equality at the out-
set,'33 but the equality is measured in terms of human dignity where our core
democratic presumption is that every individual has an equal right to be
respected. 34 Nevertheless, calibration of the penalty to reassert one's equality
is difficult to conceive. For example, if the wrongdoer is a corporation, how is
the penalty to be set? The penalty necessary to exert mastery via the award of
punitive damages seems almost boundless. Moreover, who is to be the target?
The corporation does not live and breathe. Are its officers and shareholders to
be punished?'"
A last basis for retribution is the most simple and closest to the legal
tradition. Punishment is reprobation and denunciation of the wrongful act.'"
At least one moral thread identified above is that public denunciation protects the
social fabric. This is the reason for maintaining the sense of outrage at the
infringement.' Others see reprobation as a good in itself not requiring a
showing of satisfactory consequences.3 To defend this view, an argument
must be made that punishment is necessary to support reprobation.' This
132. Jeffrie G. Murphy & Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy 127 (1988); Hampton, supra
note 120, at 1686: "[R]etribution is a response to a wrong that is intended to vindicate the value of
the victim denied by the wrongdoer's action through the construction of an event that not only
repudiates the action's message of superiority over the victim but does so in a way that confirms
them as equal by virtue of their humanity."
133. Philip Pettit and John Braithwaite, Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal
Justice 160 (1990).
134. Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire 295 (1986): "[W]e each have a general duty always to
treat the interests of others as equal in importance to our own ...." John Rawls, A Theory of
Justice §§ 11, 32-39, 77 (1971).
135. Hampton, supra note 120, at 1685-89, applies her retributive theory to Grimshaw v. Ford
Motor Co., 174 Cal. Rptr. 348 (1981), wherein the jury awarded a family of a bum victim $125
million in punitive damages. The damages were based on the profit-maximizing decision by Ford
to maintain the fuel tank placement on its vehicle. Ford put a price on life and the jury, by granting
retribution, defeated Ford's equality-defeating decision. The resolution of the jury award to $3.5
million allowed Ford to "get away with something." Id. at 1689. But the proportionality of the
punishment with the most gravity of the wrongful conduct may be defeated by the vagueness and
uncertainty of a jury setting the punishment, that steers away from proportionality. Malcolm E.
Wheeler, The Constitutional Case for Reforming Punitive Damages Procedures, 69 Va. L. Rev. 269,
310, 311 (1983); see also Ausness, supra note 6, at 41.
136. Lord Denning, Report of the Royal Commission on Capital Punishment, London: H.M.S.O.
(1984). Ronald J. Rychlak, Society's Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the
Denunciation Theory of Punishment, 65 Tul. L. Rev. 299, 331-37 (1990) (distinguishing denunciation
from retribution).
137. John Braithwaite, Crime, Shame and Reintegration (1989); Andrew Oldenquist, The Case
for Revenge, 82 The Public Interest 72 (1986); Andrew Von Hirsch, Past or Future Crimes:
Deservedness and Dangerousness in the Sentencing of Criminals 53 (1985).
138. Von Hirsch, supra note 137; Robert Nozick, Philosophical Explanations 363-97 (1981).
139. Pettit & Braithwaite, supra note 133, at 161.
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may indeed pose a problem when one turns to criminal sanctions like imprison-
ment. Why is a fine not sufficient if the public through its institutions
determines that the action is wrong? 4' The length of the sentence is a weak
proxy for moral condemnation we feel for criminal wrongdoers. 4 With
money damages, however, this symbolic act of payment is critical and may be
sensitively calibrated. This was long ago recognized with damages for
defamation. Money could not replace the good name besmirched, but the
payment was a powerful symbol of denunciation." This explains the preva-
lence of the common law's resort to punitive damages for defamation."" To
obtain a measure of reprobation does not require the assertion of mastery by the
victim through punishment; a degree that may be impossible to implement if the
wrongdoer is a large corporation. But it does service by way of reprobation. In
another way, the punitive damage award asserts the values of society in bringing
home to the wrongdoer correct values.'" To levy punitive damages is to
educate in the coin of commerce.'45
In any of these versions of retributive theory, there is no reason to give the
state a monopoly on enforcement of these norms. Provided overreaching and self-
serving behavior is constrained, private enforcement is entirely justifiable.'"
Who is to be punished? Retribution may require punishment of all and only
wrongdoers or punishment of some of the wrongdoers but only the wrongdoers.
The requirement is an advance on the deterrent argument exhibiting an
indifference as to who is punished provided that the wrongdoer is deterred. To
use the DES example above, the New York court in Hymowitz47 declared that
all distributors and manufacturers of DES in the nation with a significant market
share would be liable in proportion to that market share, although in the
individual case they could show that its DES could not have caused the
plaintiffs injury. This sits comfortably with deterrence theory but not with
retribution where no person other than a wrongdoer should be punished.'"
140. Dan M. Kahane, What Do Alternative Sanctions Mean?, 63 U. Chi. L. Rev. (forthcoming
1996).
141. Pettit & Braithwaite, supra note 133, at 161-62.
142. Windeyer in Uren v. John Fairfax & Sons, Proprietary Ltd., 117 C.L.R. 118, 150 (1966);
Carson v. John Fairfax Ltd., 178 C.L.R. 44 (1993).
143. A tradition only faintly recognized in the first amendment jurisprudence of the United States
Supreme Court in the cases flowing from New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 84 S. Ct. 710
(1964).
144. Nozick, supra note 138, at 375.
145. See C. L. Ten, Crime, Guilt and Punishment 45 (1987).
146. But compare Jeffrie G. Murphy. Retributivism, Moral Education and the Liberal State, 4
Criminal Justice Ethics 3 (1985) at 6, who wonders how the state should have any role under
retributive theory. See also A. John Simons et al, eds., in Punishment (1995).
147. Hymowitz v. Eli Lilly and Co., 539 N.E.2d 1069 (N.Y. 1989).
148. The definition of wrongdoer may be shifted to accommodate the example, but then its
meaning would be lost. It may weaken to a version that no person is individually responsi-
ble--society is the villain. Writers are critical of this slippage of individual responsibility. See Anne
M. Coughlin, Excusing Women, 82 Cal. L. Rev. 1 (1994).
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To punish some but not all wrongdoers falls short of the retributive goal.
In Kant's terms there is a categorical imperative to punish. 49 The tort private
enforcement rule fueled by the availability of punitive damages, avoids the
encumbrances of state enforcement. But the imperative may be socially
destructive by denying resort to mercy and forgiveness. It may be, for example,
that corporate wrongdoing is better prevented by the state forbearing to enforce
sanctions.'50 The criminal justice system would be unworkable if all criminals
served time. The system lives on discretion and avoidance of over-legalization
for society. A concern little raised is that private enforcement with the aid of
punitive damages may ride roughshod over sensitive, long-sighted enforcement
techniques used by the state. While this is a cost, it may not be as prevalent as
the lack of official enforcement engendered by laxity, bad faith, or just lack of
resources of state officials. In any event, the state can always adjust to overly
strenuous private enforcement by resorting to legislation to restore balance.
On the question of how to punish, the retributivists have devised detailed
schemes of desert for different types of wrongdoing.' To establish penalties
is central and according society's presumptive condemnation of a particular kind
of wrongdoing. It supports the widely held view that a proper purpose is
denunciation." 2 But at the stage of application, the call for discretion is
strong, and this for good reason. More effective enforcement of underlying
social norms may stem from suspending sentences leaving social mores and the
threat of future enforcement to admonish the wrongdoing. A clash of under-
standings about fundamental norms may lead a court to condemn the wrongful
act, but adjust the penalty to reflect the true dilemma of the wrongdoer.'53
Again, the exaction of punitive damages as embodying a highly discretionary rule
allows for such adjustment to heinousness. Hence, penalty is calibrated within
the broad rule. In other words, the rule has within it an excuse where behavior,
149. Even if a Civil Society resolved to dissolve itself with the consent of all its
members-as might be supposed in the case of a People inhabiting an island resolving to
separate and scatter themselves throughout the whole world-the last Murderer lying in
the prison ought to be executed before the resolution was carried out. This ought to be
done in order that every one may realize the desert of his deeds, and that bloodguiltiness
may not remain upon the people; for otherwise they might all be regarded as participators
in the murder as a public violation of Justice.
Immanuel Kant, The Philosophy of Law 198 (W. Hastie, trans. 1887 ed.) (1796-97).
150. John Braithwaite, To Punish or Persuade: Enforcement of Coal Mine Safety (1985).
151. Von Hirsch, supra note 137, at 557.
152. Pettit & Braithwaite, supra note 133, at 177; Rychlak. supra note 136, at 332 (stressing the
utility of denunciation).
153. The Queen v. Dudley, 15 Cox C.C. 624, 14 Q.B.D. 273 (1884) (some survivors of a
shipwreck were found liable for the murder of a cabin boy, who was killed and eaten in order to
survive); U.S. v. Holmes, 1 Wall. Jr. 1, 26 Fed. Cas. 360 (E.D. Pa. 1842) (criminal liability for
throwing overbroad passengers to save the boat from being swamped). The rich tapestry of social
backdrop and convention is described by A.W. Brian Simpson, Cannibalism and the Common Law
(1984). The jurisprudential conundra are discussed by Lon Fuller, The Case of the Speluncean
Explorers, 62 Harv. L. Rev. 616 (1949).
19961
LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW
although wrongful, could not be regarded as an arrogant disregard of the
plaintiff's rights.'54
The retributive theory, now commonly embraced, looks to consequences and
is to be so judged. The discussion has indicated that in many respects the law
of punitive damages is consonant with retributive theory, indeed even more so
than state-enforced criminal law. Nevertheless, if the theory is rooted in its
consequences, it is incomplete, since social goals have not been spelt out.
VI. REPUBLICAN THEORY
A. Formulation
The target of the punitive damages rule, as of any legal or social rule, is
embedded in some conception of the good in society. The liberal theoretician
will identify individual freedom or liberty as the value to be maximized. Rules
should be fashioned to maximize the capacity of individuals to pursue their own
interests, provided that in so doing they do not trespass on the rights of
others."' Others may choose to maximize wealth as a value.' 5  The theory
to be espoused here is likewise a consequentalist theory. It is akin to the liberal
theory, except that the interest maximized is that of welfare of individuals within
a society. This contrasts with some liberal political theorists who conceive of the
individual as a disconnected entity.' For the liberal theorist, law is a means
of promoting liberty, but not necessarily a part of what liberty is.
154. The common law in fact recognizes the obverse lesson of punitive damages awards, i.e.,
that some rights should not be asserted even though they are formally abridged. "Gold-digging"
actions for defamation provide an example: Newstead v. London Express Newspaper, Ltd. [1940]
1 K.B. 377.
155. J. S. Mill, On Liberty (Penguin, 1974):
The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a
civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either
physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.... The only part of the conduct of any
one, for which he is amendable to society, is that which concerns others. In the part
which merely concerns himself, his independencies of right, absolute.
Id. at 68-69.
The only freedom which deserves the name, is that of pursuing our own good in our own
way, so long as we do not attempt to deprive others of theirs, or impede their efforts to
obtain it.
Id. at 72.
Mankind are greater gainers by suffering each other to live as seems good to themselves,
than by compelling each to live as seems good to the rest.
Id.
156. Richard A. Posner, An Economic Theory of the Criminal Law, 85 Colum. L. Rev. 1193
(1985).
157. Thomas Hobbes, Leviathan 266 (C. B. Macpherson ed., 1968) (where men can enjoy liberty
in the nature; if in a community the political complexion is irrelevant to freedom which may be
enjoyed).
[Vol. 56
PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The idea of liberty as protection against interference has a long history in
Western thought.'58 For the republican theorist going back to Aristotle, 9
freedom from interference cannot be conceived of without the presence of others
in society and the condition that each person as a participant in a free society is not
interfered with and is given equal protection before suitable laws. The law
guarantees this freedom to a citizen. For the liberal, being left alone is freedom; for
the republican, freedom is a condition of citizenship to claim equality before the
law. Within a community a person may participate in the process of self-rule."
Freedom is inseparable from law. Citizenship is woven in the law. Its roots harken
back to the Roman republic. To be free was to be a full and equal party to the rule
of Roman law: "full libertas was [coterminous with civitas].""' The same
notion can be found in the medieval terms "freedom" and "franchise." 1"2
The republican wrapping of the individual with the community and the law
concerns some liberals who see that the individual may be subordinated and
freedom lost. Richard Epstein, for example, worries that communitarian or
republican theories were part of the standard stock and trade of many "enlight-
ened" fascist theories." 3 He sees that voluntary associations are in danger.' 6
Liberalism, he argues, upholds communitarian values"6S while not endangering
158. J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment (1975). Constitutional law has attracted the
attention of those proposing a republican discourse. It has two sources: historical scholarship, e.g.,
Gordon S. Wood, The Creation of the American Republic, 1776-1787 (1969); Robert E. Shalhope,
Republicanism and Early American Historigraphy, 39 Win. & Mary Q. 334 (1982); but cf J.C;D.
Clark, English Society 1688-1832: Ideology, Social Structure, and Political Practice During the
Ancien Regime 423-24 (1985); and normative critique that runs counter to liberalism (at least in some
respects), e.g., Alasdair C. MacIntyre, After Virtue (1981). As Richard Fallon states, the term is
difficult to define. He sees it would encompass a few core tenets: that "human beings are essentially
political animals, that they can fulfill their natures only by participating in self-government, and that
the most important aims of the political community should be to promote virtue among the citizenry
and to advance the common good." Richard H. Fallon, Jr., What is Republicanism, and Is It Worth
Reviving?, 102 Hare. L. Rev. 1695, 1697 (1989) (citations omitted). Intellectual streams are set forth
powerfully in David Lieberman, The Province of Legislation Determined: Legal Theory in
Eighteenth-Century Britain 8.22 (1989). As explained below, the version adopted here has the notion
of "full dominion," a socially based liberty at its core. In Michelman's terms republicanism affurs
a "positive freedom" and not simply the "negative" freedom of liberalism. Frank I. Michelman,
Traces of Self-Government, 100 Hare. L. Rev. 4 (1986).
159. Kronman, supra note 37, at 36.
160. Kronman, supra note 37, at 37.
161. Chaim Wirszubski, Libertas as a Political Idea at Rome During the Late Republic and Early
Principate 3-4 (1950).
162. C.S. Lewis, Studies in Words 125 (1967).
163. Richard A. Epstein, Simple Rules for a Complex World 320 (1995); see also Holmes, supra
note 64, at 59. Within the field of tort scholarship Professor Robert Post has been prominent in
utilizing communitarian norms in his analysis: Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy:
Community and Self in the Common Law Tort, 77 Calif. L. Rev. 957 (1989).
164. Epstein, supra note 163, at 323.
165. Id. at 324; see Holmes, supra note 64, at 98-246, arguing that liberalism includes within
it many communitarian ideals.
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liberty. This may be the case where the theory is enriched by reference to the
individual in society. If an individual is to fulfill a life's plan it must be done
with a society of fellow beings who also must be free to pursue their life plans.
Communities determine individuals' identities. The kind of society must be
pluralistic in the sense that "a multiplicity of values" is not only recognized, but
"their pursuit must be a real option available to its members."'" But society
and pursuit of life plans depend upon culture, custom, and a public conception
of justice rooted in our concept of the good.'67 No doubt statist republicanism
may be used to subvert freedom. It is essential, therefore, that the republican
idea has embedded within it guarantees from oppression of the totalitarian state.
Numbers of liberty-based restraints may be proposed. Braithwaite and Pettit, in
framing their republican theory, recognize the need to stipulate conditions for the
republican community. These conditions comprise affording the citizen what
they call "full dominion." The individual enjoys full dominion if and only if:
(1) She enjoys no less a prospect of liberty than is available to other
citizens.
(2) It is common knowledge among citizens that this condition obtains,
so that she and nearly everyone else knows that she enjoys the prospect
mentioned, she and everyone else knows that the others generally know
this too, and so on.
(3) She enjoys no less a prospect of liberty than the best that is
compatible with the same prospect for all citizens.'"
The last requirement is delphic but is explained by Braithwaite and Pettit in
terms of a choice between two political societies. Let us dub them Athens and
Sparta.' 69 In each the citizens have equal prospects for liberty, but suppose in
Athens the prospects are larger because, for example, it exacts smaller taxes than
Sparta. Athens then ought to be preferred. The citizen of Sparta will enjoy less
dominion than the citizen of Athens.
Dominion is defended as a goal or target of the criminal justice system
because it meets three desiderata. These are whether the target is uncontrover-
sial, stable, and satiable. Pettit and Braithwaite gauge whether a criminal justice
system may conform to these desiderata, while keeping faith with the target. As
a preliminary matter, I investigate whether tort liability for punitive damages may
also comply.
166. Joseph Raz, Ethics in the Public Domain 104 (1994); Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's
Discontent: America in Search of a Public Philosophy 346-51 (1996) (noting the problem of
coercion).
167. Id. at 46-69; see also Holmes, supra note 64, at 200: "[L]iberals retained an emphatic
conception of the common good." But cf Sandel, supra note 166, criticizing the attempt to bring
liberalism and republicanism together.
168. Pettit & Braithwaite, supra note 133, at 64-65. This describes a view of liberalism
enunciated by Holmes, supra note 64, at 198-256.
169. Pettit & Braithwaite, supra note 133, at 66-67.
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Take the first, uncontroversiality. Crime invades dominion by destroying or
compromising the victim's dominion: his prospect of liberty is surrendered. If
we turn from crime to other acts that invade dominion, it is uncontroversial that
a consciously wrongful act directed against the rights of others flouts those
others' equal prospect of liberty. A society that guards liberty cannot tolerate
wantonly wrongful acts that injure others' person or property. Thus, a system
directed toward full dominion would protect citizens against such actions by
bringing its enforcement machinery to bear.
Take the second, stability. Legal sanction demands that negative liberties
be protected. The state should provide machinery to vindicate rights and, at the
same time, that machinery should avoid becoming oppressive. In the sphere of
criminal law, concern is that for the state to drive to eradicate liberty-robbing
crime may be counterproductive. The apparatus of criminal law enforcement
may fill the land eroding citizens' faith in negative or individual freedom. It
follows that not only are individual rights a necessity, but also the state must
show restraint in enforcement of criminal law. The dangers of an overzealous
state are nicely overcome in permitting private enforcement of the kinds of
liberty-robbing actions at the heart of tortious punitive damage awards. The
dangers in overreaching of state action are avoided by obviating the need of the
criminal law to map the multifarious and changing range of proscribed
behavior.' ° At the same time, the liberty of the citizen to be free from
consciously arrogant abuse of rights is protected.
Take the last, satiability. The target of dominion should be tested against
the possibility that voracious demands may be made for the punishment of the
guilty in criminal law. A problem besetting deterrence theory is that any
punishment is justifiable if it furthers society's good. But under the dominion
principle, the punishment should, in order to protect the citizen's liberty, be
minimally coercive. 7' We may decide that corporate wrongdoing in knowing-
ly selling dangerous products could be curbed by shooting managers of the
corporation. Indeed, empirical studies may show this. A principle of dominion
searches for the least-intrusive strategy to protect the victim's dominion. This
may be via regulation or tort action. The tort action with punitive damages is
symbolic of a finding of wrongdoing. It protects the victim's liberty, symbolical-
ly by condemning the wrongful act, and, tangibly by money damages. The
victim is thus assured that she is not devalued as a person by the wrongful act,
and that her dominion is worthy of respect. The tort action also promotes
reintegration in the community of the victim and the offender. Compensation
170. Tort law is a well-used category for resolution of problems that occur in other fields where
the resolution within that field would be problematic, e.g., tort law solving the problems surrounding
enforcement of long-term relational contracts. See Partlett, supra note 81.
171. Pettit & Braithwaite, supra note 133, at 80. It may be that the dominance of imprisonment
as criminal punishment in preference to corporate punishment stems from a republican notion of
satiability; for a suggestion of republican roots see Kahane, supra note 140, at 23-25.
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aids the victim in this process and the offender, while punished, may continue
to function productively and act as a good citizen. '72
An important attribute of the republican ideal is that the institutions that
undergird it are not coercive. A significant scope is given to formative
institutions that seek to encourage deliberation between citizens, state officials,
and the state itself."' Virtuous habits are thereby cultivated. Dominion is
enhanced by wider appreciation of accepted behavior and the hand strengthened
of non-coercive enforcement through means of shame or reprobation. 7' Civic
virtue guards against official corruption and wrongdoing. Tradition in the legal
profession may be seen as one of these formative institutions which promotes
deliberation and wise decisionmaking.7s The jury is a direct way in which the
community is brought within the administration of justice. Service imposes a
civil obligation and democraticizes deliberations of the courts. Its central place
in the federal and state constitutions is therefore quite natural.'76 Juries, as
Akhil Amar says, are political institutions and not procedural. They exist to
"promote democracy for the jurors, not efficient adjudication for the parties."'"
B. The Advantage of a Republican Theory
Retribution as a base for justifying punitive damages has much to commend
it. But it falls short. Retribution does not have a clear goal, a conception of the
good, which is to be maximized. Just deserts as a just criterion fails to answer
many questions about the desirable shape of the law. But retribution is a potent
idea because it fulfills the goal of republican dominion in a number of ways. It
respects the liberty of the citizen in not punishing the innocent. It reviews the
individual transaction and modulates desert to recognize the victim's liberty. It
explains why criminal law does not adequately fulfill society's punishment
objectives-the coercive state is constrained. And finally, retribution allows for
subtle sanctions such as reprobation as an appropriate sanction.
172. This is something that the criminal law punishment leaves out of the equation. 0. Ganz,
Criminal Injuries Compensation: The Constitutional Issue, 59 Mod. L. Rev. 95 (1996); Coffee, supra
note 38, at 231 (discussing the compensatory nature of the criminal law).
173. Pettit & Braithwaite, supra note 133, at 82; Kronman, supra note 37, at 42. The formative
agenda in inculcating "civic virtue" is fully developed in Sandel, supra note 166, at 317-51.
174. Braithwaite, supra note 114, at 68-83; Kahane, supra note 140.
175. Kronman, supra note 37, at 215, discussing tradition in constraining appellate judges; more
extensively Kronman discusses the ideal of the "lawyer-statesman" at length, id. at 109-162. Most
economists are highly suspicious of formative institutions, often distilling them into sets of
individualistic motivations. But liberalism as of the genre of Madison requires "virtue," Holmes,
supra note 64, at 227.
176. Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a Constitution, 100 Yale L.J. 1131, 1183-89 (1991)
(referring to both the grand and the petit jury). Amar describes the jury as the "paradigmatic image
underlying the Bill of Rights," id. at 1190.
177. Akhil Reed Amar, Juries: Ten Suggested Reforms, 28 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 1169, 1175
(1995). Jeffrey Abramson, We, the Jury: The Jury System and the Ideal of Democracy (1995)
(arguing the link between the jury, self-government, and justice).
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I have suggested above how punitive damages in tort law may fit the
retributive republican model outline. The availability of private enforcement
empowers citizens to assert dominion. The ability to demand redress and process
of claiming itself is a formative institution. The participation of the jury in the
process and the discourse between judge and jury are likewise instruments for
inculcation of civic virtue.
The capacity of the court in awarding punitive damages furthers dominion by
graduating damages to accord with heinousness. Furthermore, damages carry a
significant symbolic power. The victim is reintegrated in society through payment
and the offender reintegrated by bowing to process and continuing to operate in the
community. The tort system accords equal respect to the wronged individual. The
legitimacy, then, of the political community is enhanced by its affording private
rights of action to enforce liberty-robbing infringements. The process confims the
centrality of personal responsibility, which may be occluded when enforcement is
exclusively left to public officials.
C. An Excursion on Corporations
In this account of the compatibility of punitive damages with the republican
goal of dominion, can one be attacked as quixotic? Society, where individual actors
promote a political union, may be argued to be remote from modem industrial
society, where corporations play such a highly influential role.'78 Since corpora-
tions are overwhelmingly defendants in tort suits seeking punitive damages,",
this issue is particularly pertinent in this paper. In short compass, my argument is
that the republican model is apposite where corporations are major players. In
contrast, the deterrence180 and purely retributive rationales have severe shortcom-
ings.
In deterrence theory, the corporation is an organization with its own gover-
nance structure. Any rule should be designed to direct the sting of the penalty to
those human actors within the organization who will be in the best position to steer
the corporation from its wrongdoing. Punitive damages may be awarded against
the corporation's human agents or vicariously against the corporation. 8' But
punitive damages are a blunt instrument set against an enigmatic organization."
178. Some criminal law theorists omit corporate crime, e.g., George P. Fletcher, Rethinking
Criminal Law (1978).
179. E. Donald Elliott, Why Punitive Damages Don't Deter Corporate Misconduct Effectively,
40 Ala. L. Rev. 1053, 1060 (1989).
180. Cf. Owen, Civil Punishment, supra note 49, at 110, arguing the company is more sensitive
than the individual to the deterrent effect of punitive awards. But elsewhere Owen displays little faith
in deterrence. Owen, Punitive Damages, supra note 52, at 1285-86.
181. The corporation itself could not be said to be an entity with mental capacity to intend
consciously to wrong another. See Donald R. Cressey, The Poverty of Theory in Corporate Criminal
Research, 1 Advances in Criminological Theory 31 (1988).
182. The issue is one of group as collective behavior, see Mancur Olson, Jr., The Logic of
Collective Action (1965); Kenneth J. Arrow, Social Choice and Individual Values (2d ed. 1963).
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It may be that more responsive corporate behavior would be garnered by enlisting
the corporation to keep its own house in order by superior monitoring of potential
wrongdoers within its organization. It follows that, if the corporation has initiated
and maintained reasonable monitoring, it should not be vicariously liable, lest it
lose its incentive to monitor. But that good housekeeping itself may expose the
corporation to a tort suit for punitive damages since it will now more likely be taken
to know of its wrongdoing." 3 However, if the corporation is not vicariously
liable, the plaintiff faces a potential defendant-the corporate officer-who is a
person of straw. Thus, without the prospect of collecting a judgment, the
machinery for private enforcement is still-born." The limited liability enjoyed
by corporations may also blunt the deterrence incentives faced by corporations.
Too little may be spent on precautions to avoid accidents. 5
With the weakness of deterrence signals, a retributive rationale is more
appealing. A punitive damage award represents a wrongdoing corporation's just
deserts. A corporation may be punished in proportion to desert as a measured
way of expressing the community's degree of reprobation."' Provided the
corporations can be viewed as rational actors (and they are indeed society's most
rational, as profit maximizers), they are amenable to retributive calculus. It
cannot be said of corporations that weaknesses of the flesh or mind should
mitigate punishment. Moreover, reprobation may assuage the individual's hurt
in being treated as less than an equal. To suffer such insult at the hands of an
entity that is regarded as quintessentially rational points even more to the need
for retribution. However, here I want to urge the superiority of a republican
concept. The idea is that reprobation is fully embraced where an individual's
dominion is invaded by the wrongful act of the corporation. In an era where
overweening corporate power is a concern, the sense of control in asserting
dominion is provided by a legal outlet that allows private enforcement against
large corporations. The citizen, by dint of access to punitive damages, is
restored to full rights as an equal by the symbolic power of punitive damages as
Within the corporation, game-theory can be enlightening: Masahiko Aoki, The Co-operative Game
Theory of the Firm (1984).
183. Jennifer Arlen, The Potentially Perverse Effects of Corporate Criminal Liability, 23 J. Leg.
Stud. 833 (1994).
184. Jackson v. Johns-Manville Sales Corp., 781 F.2d 394 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 478 U.S.
1022, 106 S. Ct. 3339 (1986); Tideway Oil Programs, Inc. v. Serio, 431 So. 2d 454, 461 (Miss.
1983). The primary measure should be retribution, not the sum necessary to foment litigation, cf
Robert D. Cooter, Economic Analysis of Punitive Damages, 56 S. Cal. L. Rev. 79, 90 (1982).
185. Steven Shavell, The Judgment Proof Problem, 6 Int'l Rev. L. & Econ. 45 (1986).
186. Von Hirsch, supra note 137. A practical problem exacerbating the ensuring of
proportionality of punishment is the combination of criminal and civil punishment and the
multiplicity of actions that may be brought against large corporations. Corporations may be
overpunished if courts are insensitive to these matters. If deterrence is the rationale the same
concerns loom large. Some regard these as confounding a theory based on retribution or deterrence,
Ausness, supra note 6, at 57-74. But they call rather for carefully tailored rules and not the
abandonment of the sustaining rationale.
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well as compensated. The citizen is then more than a cipher in the economic
system.
A pure retributive theory holds that only the guilty should be punished. This
is a prime obstacle in applying the theory to a corporation. Those that suffer
from the imposition of punitive damages include innocent shareholders.'87 But
retribution tied to a republican compact is more complete. The cost of a
shareholder's voluntary arrangement with a corporation is the responsibility that
she shares for the corporation's wrongdoing.
The shareholder is a participant in a voluntary joint venture. Her association
with the corporation garners financial and psychic rewards. Limited liability of
shareholders does not reflect on the blameworthiness of shareholders, but is,
perhaps mistakenly, a mechanism leading to more efficient capital formation."
To be sure, the modem corporation has widely spread shareholders, who enjoy
limited liability, and have no close attachment to the corporation. It is for this
reason that punitive damages may be most efficacious. They provide a sting that
comes to the attention of shareholders. Their availability overcomes some of the
drawbacks of limited liability.'89 The award is symbolic of wrongdoing and
shames at least those who were close to the corporate decision."is The
corporation is more than a web of contracts or artificial entities, but may be seen
187. John C. Coffee, Jr., "No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry Into
the Problem of Corporate Punishment, 79 Mich. L. Rev. 386, 400-05 (1981); Ausness, supra note
6, at 43-46.
188. Stephen B. Presser, Thwarting the Killing of the Corporation: Limited Liability,
Democracy, and Economics, 87 Nw. U. L. Rev. 148, 177 (1992) (arguing the intention of the limited
liability form both to encourage investment and to promote democracy).
189. Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for
Corporate Torts, 100 Yale L.J. 1879 (1991) (suggesting a regime of shareholder liability). But see
Robert B. Thompson, Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate
Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1 (recommending against liability for
passive shareholders on either risk sharing or control grounds). Punitive damages may be a second-
best solution to direct shareholder liability. The feasibility of liability is commented on in Lewis T.
Evans and Neil C. Quigley, Shareholder Liability Regimes, Principal-Agent Relationships, and
Banking Industry Performance, 38 J. of L. & Econ. 497 (1995) (suggesting its feasibility in light of
historical experience).
190. Shaming is an aspect of reprobation that importantly moderates the viciousness of penalties
but may more effectively enforce social norms and satisfy proportional retribution. Some cultures
are particularly amenable to shaming as punishment, e.g., Japanese culture, see Braithwaite, supra
note 114, at 62-65. Shaming may also play a reintegrative role through apology ceremonies, John
Braithwaite & Stephen Mugford, Conditions of Successful Reintegration Ceremonies, 34 Brit. J.
Criminology 139 (1994). See supra text at note 114. But in American society it may be efficacious.
Large numbers of illegal aliens and small numbers of inspectors have created problems with
compliance with the Fair Labor Standards Act in the Los Angeles garment industry. Secretary of
Labor Reich has devised an enforcement policy to have manufacturers and retailers monitor their
contractors to guard against sweatshop working conditions. Garment Firms in Los Angeles Agree
to Police Contractors for Wage Violations, Washington Insider (BNA) June 21, 1995. Compare
Coffee, supra note 38, at 200-01 (arguing that exercise of punitive damages will diminish its stigma).
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as a politico-legal system where deterrence and retribution operate in
microsym. g'
The award of punitive damages of significant quantum calls for explanation
from management thus reinforcing its accountability. The process of exaction,
payment, and explanation brings the corporation to book in the eyes of the wide
community'92 and thereafter permits its reintegration as a wholesome and
useful participant in the social endeavor.'93
D. A Republican Explanation
To this point I have outlined the essence of the republican ideal, and how
within that ideal a willful wrongdoer may be penalized in punitive damages. The
justification comports with the desiderata that applied to punishment of criminal
wrongdoers.
My thesis is that the further a community departs from the republican ideal,
the more the application of punitive damages will become problematical. Those
damages may become arbitrary and erratic. If I am correct, this may explain the
191. Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite, Corporations, Crime and Accountability 81 (1993).
192. The corporation may be seen as a democratizing institution:
The object and intention of the legislature in authorizing the association of individuals for
manufacturing purposes was ... to facilitate the formation of partnerships without the
risks ordinarily attending them, and to encourage internal manufactures. There is nothing
of an exclusive nature in the statute; but the benefits from associating and becoming
incorporated ... are offered to all who will conform to its requisitions. There are no
franchises or privileges which are not common to the whole community. In this respect
incorporations under the statute differ from corporations to whom some exclusive ...
privileges are granted. The only advantages of an incorporation under the statute over
partnerships... consist in a capacity to manage the affairs of the institution by a few...
agents, and by an exoneration from any responsibility beyond the amount of the individual
subscriptions.
Slee v. Bloom, 19 Johns 366, 474 (N.Y. 1822), quoted in Ronald E. Seavoy, The Origins of the
American Business Corporation, 1784-1855, at 70 (1982). For discussion see Presser, supra note
188, at 155-56. In this sense the corporation is, like other institutions, a participant in the political
mission of the community. Society is replete with institutions that intermediate between government
and the individual-churches, trade unions, organized professions--that enable the delivery of
security, participation, and choice of goals. Terence C. Halliday, Legal Professions and the State:
Neocorporatist Variations on the Pluralist Theme of Liberal Democracies, in Lawyers in Society:
Comparative Theories 375, at 384 (Richard L. Abel & Philip S.C. Lewis, eds., 1989). For an
argument on the crucial role of mediating institutions for democracy see Jean Bethke Elshtain,
Democracy on Trial 19-21 (1995); Sandel, supra note 166, at 348.
193. Note I do not enter the thicket of toxic and class action suits. See Gary T. Schwartz, Mass
Torts and Punitive Damages: A Comment, 39 Vill. L. Rev. 415 (1994) (the common law jury
process of assessment of punitive damages which can be evaluated as inflicting normatively
inappropriate multiple punishments). The overexaction of punitive damages flouts the proportionality
principle of retribution and the republican gloss proposed in this article. The solution is to be found
in reform of procedural rules. Schwartz, id. at 431, alludes to the national class action for punitive
damages. He ponders, however, that the suggestion is of a "public" character and raises anew the
question of why criminal law is not the appropriate instrument.
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reality of punitive damages, their volatility, their severity, and their frequency in
hot zones throughout the nation.
In establishing this argument, something should be said about the substantive
rules of award of punitive damages. Those rules are framed in a highly discretion-
ary and highly localized fashion. They invest a great deal of discretion in the jury
to award damages within the context of the dispute. Therefore, much uncertainty
and diversity is invited. The payoff for the open-textured rule is that dominion is
maximized by its operation in this fashion.'" The community garners a great
sense of participation by an individual rendering of justice where case-specific
decision-making drives toward fair outcomes.S' The entire process is a forma-
tive institution where all participants are brought within the community's web of
the law. The retributive aspects of the ideal are met by juries and judges calibrating
the award to accord with its heinousness.
But this is an ideal. The law may have a republican goal of dominion but also
depend upon the substrata of that republican community to nurture the goal. In
almost all circumstances the substratum is mainly intact, hence supporting the law
and the dominion which flow from it. For example, as Michael Saks shows, the
civic responsibility of the majority of juries is demonstrated." The substratum,
194. Cass R. Sunstein, Problems with Rules, 83 Calif. L. Rev. 955, 959, 1012-20 (1995)
(pointing to the tension between rules, guidelines, and standards and arguing for reference to context
in judgment their efficacy).
195. Catherine Pierce Wells, Tort Law as Corrective Justice: A Pragmatic Justification for Jury
Adjudication, 88 Mich. L. Rev. 2348, at 2413 (1990) (stressing the jury function in tort law as part
of the quest for individual justice and fairness as an important aspiration for tort law). But cf.
Schwartz, supra note 193, at 426 (indicating the benefits of investing the judge with damages-setting
authority).
196. Professor Michael J. Saks, What Do Jury Experiments Tell Us About How Juries (Should)
Make Decisions (unpublished 31 December 1995) (on file with author) concludes:
Their verdicts drive most debate about juries, so it is important to evaluate the meaning
of these verdicts (Section VIII). Many of the arguments on which reforms are grounded
depend upon unexamined assumptions about verdicts and awards. Some important
findings are that: Judges and juries agree on the verdict in about four-fifths of cases. The
research evidence suggests that judges are not generally better factfinders than jurors; no
systematic evidence suggests that judges are better even in complex cases. Recent federal
data show that jurors convict at a far higher rate than do judges. Juries make civil awards
that are more consistent and predictable than arbitrators and lower than professional claims
administrators. In the aggregate, between one-half and three-fourths of the variance in
jury awards can be accounted for by the seriousness of the plaintiffs injuries. These
findings suggest that jury awards are far less irrational and unpredictable than is popularly
imagined. Which in turn suggests that reforms aimed at solving the "problem" of
irrational jury verdicts should be approached with caution and with evidence.
Scholarship on the functioning of juries in the civil justice system is extensive. From the point of
view of instrumental theories of tort law--deterrence, compensation, and loss distribution (enterprise
liability), juries may be described as fumbling and unwieldy institutions. It is unsurprising that
England and the Commonwealth with Benthamite instrumentalism have rejected the jury. They are
most imperfect instruments in delivering accurate adjudications and indeed in rendering horizontal
equity---treating like cases alike. Cf. Jeffrey Abramson, We the Jury 90 (1994) (seeing a shift in the
idea of liberty). Much of the reform effort in the law of damages is directed to overcome these
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however, may disintegrate once the institutions of the jury, the judiciary, and the
legal profession lose civic responsibility or practical wisdom." 7 Restraint, so
important in exercising punishing power, is swamped by the irresponsible exercise
of power. Isolated jurisdictions around the nation may be particularly susceptible
to this. The next two sections will discuss the evidence that the crisis in punitive
damages is isolated to hot zones. Then why should the aberrations have occurred
in these zones? Only empirical studies will answer these questions, but as I then
argue, the very uncertainty ought to make us slow to accept radical reforms of the
law. The reforms may be wasteful and pernicious.
VII. THE EVIDENCE RELATING TO PUNITIVE DAMAGES
The target of critics of the tort system has shifted over the years. Medical
malpractice and product liability are two areas to receive a crisis rating.
shortcomings. See Randall R. Bovbjerg, Frank A. Sloan, & James F. Blumstein, Valuing Life and
Limb in Tort: Scheduling "Pain and Suffering," 83 Nw. U. L. Rev. 908 (1989); James F. Blumstein,
Randall R. Bovbjerg, & Frank A. Sloan, Beyond Tort Reform: Developing Better Tools for Assessing
Damages for Personal Injury, 8 Yale J. on Reg. 171 (1991); Glen 0. Robinson & Kenneth S.
Abraham, Collective Justice in Tort Law, 78 Va. L. Rev. 1481 (1992); David Baldus, John C.
MacQueen, George Woodworth, Improving Judicial Oversight of Jury Damages Assessments: A
Proposal for the Comparative Additur/Remittitur Review of Awards for Nonpecuniary Harms and
Punitive Damages, 80 Iowa L. Rev. 1109 (1995) (recommending an enhanced methodology for
comparative additur/remittiture review of general and punitive damages). The authors in Baldus et
al., id. at 1170 n.149, 1180 n.171, refer to the more ordered comparative fashion of the English courts
in awarding damages. Recall that Lord Devlin in Rookes v. Barnard [1964] A.C. 1129, 1222 (H.L.)
despaired so of the looseness of punitive damages that he would award a conventional sum. More
recently, the English Court of Appeals has called for restraints on the jury function. Elton John v.
MGN Ltd., [1996] 2 All Eng. Rep. 35 (1995). Baldus et al., at 1124 and 1183, do ask whether to
adopt a comparative system as proposed would invite "bureaucratic justic"-a departure from the
common law tradition of individualistic justice.
The cognitive ability of the jury to deal with the complexity of legal concepts, in particular
concepts of the law of negligence, is thoroughly discussed by Neal R. Feigenson, The Rhetoric of
Torts: How Advocates Help Jurors Think About Causation, Reasonableness, and Responsibility, 47
Hastings L. Rev. 61 (1995) (offering a comprehensive summary of jurors' interpretation of the law
of negligence, dependent on counsels' arguments and jurors' decision-making). The unpredictability
and unconstrained nature of jury decisions increases horizontal inequity. Such has been an abiding
concern with non-economic losses in personal injuries. This is exacerbated by juries' and jurors'
reactions to instructions, see Edward T. McCaffery et al., Framing the Jury: Cognitive Perspectives
on Pain and Suffering Awards, 81 Va. L. Rev. 1341 (1995).
Apart from any jury function that would balance costs and benefits, Professor Michael Wells sees
the jury as a vehicle for the application of dominant social expectations and practices to the
controversy in issue. Michael Wells, Scientific Policymaking and the Torts Revolution: The Revenge
of the Ordinary Observer, 26 Ga. L. Rev. 725, 732-33 (1992). From a vantage point outside the
United States this view of the jury is "strangely anachronistic and highly romantic," see lzhak
Englard, The Philosophy of Tort Law 157 n.27 (1993). For defense of the jury see Wells, supra.
See also in the same vein Steven D. Smith, Rhetoric and Rationality in the Law of Negligence, 69
Minn. L. Rev. 277 (1984).
197. Kronman, supra note 37, at 151-52.
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Transcending all these areas are punitive damages awards. Critics argue that if
liability has been too pro-plaintiff, the remedy of super compensatory damages
has badly exacerbated the already loose and uncertain rules. In confirmation,
these critics say that punitive damages are routinely awarded, that they are of
great quantum, that the frequency and size has been increasing, and that this is
a phenomenon of national proportions. 9
The work of Daniels and Martin provides a debunking of much of the rhetoric.
Reality is more complex as analysis is extended to cover a large number of
jurisdictions over a wide expanse of years. The authors discuss and analyze data
derived from local jury verdict reporters.'" This information, which is generated
for the use of attorneys, is fairly accurate and covers the majority of verdicts in
thesejurisdictions. Eighty-two sites covering one hundred counties in sixteen states
are included to reflect a combination of regional balance and available source
material.2"o The information is sliced in various ways to show plaintiff win rates
in various categories and median awards in those categories.
In respect of punitive damages, the authors' data for 1988-90 reveal that
punitive damages were awarded in 4.5% of all verdicts and in 8.3% of winning
verdicts. But some sites revealed no punitive damages awards, while some reported
a 20% rate in winning verdicts.2 ' Punitives were more likely in cases involving
financial harm than in physical harm.2 2 Local influences were at play. In Los
Angeles County, the median punitive damage award increased far in excess to
comparative figures for other sites.2"3 A large number of insurance bad-faith
claims seems to explain this discrepancy. t ' Five sites had medians above
$100,000. Two of the five had relatively few punitive damage awards. 5
198. Stephen Daniels and Joanne Martin, Civil Juries and the Politics of Reform (1995)
(hereinafter "D&M").
199. Id. at 66-68.
200. Id. at 68.
201. Id. at 241 (Cook County Illinois yielded a rate of 1.4%; Travis County, Texas yielded
29.1 0/o-the highest rate). Id. at 214.
202. Id. at 217-18. In physical harm cases the punitive damages rate was low fluctuating from
0.8% in Cook County, Illinois, to 12.7 in Bexor, Texas. It exceeds 5% in 9 of 22 sites, and exceeds
10% in three sites. Id. at 219. In financial harm the rate was from a low of 2.1% in Cook County,
Illinois, to 44.4% in District 9, Texas. Id.
203. The book's conclusions are confirmed in another recent survey. U.S. Dept. of Justice,
Bureau of Justice Statistics Special Report, Civil Jury Cases and Verdicts in Large Counties, Civil
Justice Survey of State Courts, 1992, July 1995. "Juries included punitive damages as part of the
overall award in 6% of the cases in which the plaintiff won. Punitive damages accounted for about
10% of all money awarded to plaintiffs. The median award was $50,000. Twenty-four percent...
were over $250,000, and 12% were $1 million or more." The statistics are broken into different torts
revealing patterns similar to those of the books' authors. Not all the studies that demonstrate a sober
view are recent, see Punitive Damages: A Constructive Examination. Report of the Special
Committee on Punitive Damages, 1986 ABA Sec. Litig.
204. D&M, supra note 198, at 218.
205. Id. at 221.
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The authors look at verdicts over a twenty-one year time frame to gauge
whether the trend is to higher frequency and severity. The rates for bodily injury
remained remarkably stable.2" For financial harm, the figures display higher
punitive damage rates and variability between sites is marked. In Dallas over the
twenty-one year period the rate was 15.3%, in Jackson, MO 21%; and in Los
Angeles, 32.2%. But in Cook County, Ill., the overall rate was only 5.5%.'°
Plaintiffs are more likely to receive punitive damages in emotional/reputational
cases but the reported cases are very small and do not allow for meaningful
temporal comparisons.
Have the quantums of damages risen rapidly? Once more the figures are
mixed. For Cook County, the median award dropped in the period 1977-80 from
$18,145 to $12,000 and then rose to $28,750 in the 1986-90 period. Fluctuations
are evident in figures from other sites. In Los Angeles median awards are
substantially higher than elsewhere. But that is not representative.'08 The high
end of the award, the top 25% of verdicts, reveal the greatest increase. The
financial harm cases accounted for the largest proportion of cases in the top 25%
of the punitive damages distribution."l As mentioned it was those cases that
mainly fueled the Los Angeles increases.
Lastly, Daniels and Martin discuss whether punitive damages represent a
greater and increasing proportion of compensation dollars. They find no general
pattern of increase in the "percentage of the total award represented by punitive
damages over time or an increase in the rates of punitive damages to other
damages."21°
As with data on products liability and medical malpractice awards the picture
for punitive damages is complex and variable. Twelve sites reported no punitive
damages, but three reported rates of over 20% of winning verdicts in 1988-90
data."' The typical award is modest with ten sites below a $50,000 median
and five more under $30,000. But five of twenty-two sites have median awards
in excess of $100,000.
The authors conclude that the system has not "devolved into chaos or some
other degenerate state, but [constitutes] an orderly system that did not change in
any major way over the 21 year period." '
The law, it seems, is like politics in that it is all local." 3 So often we see
a smooth surface where complexity is the reality.214 The authors make the
206. Id. at 224.25.
207. Id. at 224.
208. Id. at 227-28.
209. Id. at 234.
210. Id. at 238.
211. Id. at 241.
212. Id.
213. "All politics is local." The late Tip O'Neil, former Speaker of the United States House of
Representatives. Tip O'Neill, All Politics is Local and Other Rules of the Game (1994).
214. On legal complexity see Peter H. Shuck, Legal Complexity: Some Causes, Consequence,
and Cures, 42 Duke L.J. 1 (1992).
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point that until we understand the nature of claims, it will be impossible to know
the effectiveness of any law reform. Why do individuals choose to pursue
claims? How do plaintiffs' lawyers select claims they will pursue? How are
matters settled?"' The authors make a plea for this kind of research. They
may be right to do so, but it is painstaking. Frank Sloan and colleagues, for
example, attempted to obtain information about the claims process in medical
malpractice by interviewing claimants in respect of a set of medical malpractice
claims in Florida." 6 This work reveals that many of the assumptions about the
purposes for claiming, the way in which lawyers are selected, and claimants'
satisfaction with the claims system, are far removed from the assumptions that
many hold of the claims process. As Daniels and Martin show, work done by
Michael Saks and others on jury decision-making debunks the notion that that
central institution is monolithically pro-plaintiff and anti-corporation. t
The same pattern can be seen in figures recently published by the Bureau of
Justice Statistics." 8 The same sites of problem punitive damages linger. In
Dallas, Texas, the median award for 1992 was $3,996,555; for New York, New
York, $940,792; and for Los Angeles, California, $1,103,945. Wayne, Michigan,
however, revealed a mean of $3,000, whereas the mean for 1988-90 was
$124,150. Cook County also had declined from $31,500 for 1988-90 to $9,000
(1992).19
Jury verdicts are but the tip of the claims process. Most cases are settled
and the information on settlements is aggregated. Jury verdicts, however, are
telling, because they cast a shadow on the entire claiming process. The size and
frequency of punitive damages influence the willingness to, and size of,
settlements. They also have a gravitational pull on whether claims are lodged
in the first place. " ° The greater the value of the claim the more probable that
it will be initiated. The valuation may even encourage those claims that have a
reduced chance of success. A plaintiff's attorney is likely to perform a hard-
nosed appraisal of the value of the claim taking it as a function of the chances
of success and its expected return on settlement or verdict." The concern
may be especially great if the damages are uncertain. The system becomes
costly if claims are pushed to later settlement or to court.
It is this part of the claims pyramid that attracts analysis from some who
assail punitive damages. Their contention is that many claims are stimulated by
the prospect of inclusion of punitive damage claims. These are commonly
215. D&M, supra note 198, at 243.
216. Frank A. Sloan, et al., Suing for Malpractice (1993), Chap. 4; for discussion of this work
and that of others see Neil Vidmar, Medical Malpractice and the American Jury 42-43 (1995).
217. D&M, supra note 198, at 17, 182, 193.
218. See supra note 203.
219. I have not adjusted for inflation; the Martin & Daniels figures are quoted in 1990 dollars.
220. Stephen Daniels & Joanne Martin, Myth and Reality in Punitive Damages, 75 Minn. L.
Rev. 1, 28 (1990).
221. Sloan et al., supra note 216, at 78-89; Coffee, supra note 38, at 232.
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lodged, so it is asserted, in actions against business and government. m The
studies of the type analyzed above, founded on jury verdict data, fail to select out
for the influence of claims. These may lengthen the time to reach settlement or
increase the payouts for claimants. 3
This research is of little consequence, for it fails to address the fundamental
issue. It is trite to say that the possibility of punitive damages may increase
payouts; any other result would be surprising. The question is never broached
that the stimulus may be desirable in bringing to book conscious wrongdoing in
order that it may be better deterred and just deserts allocated. Of course, the
critics of punitive damages have something else in mind. They would assert that
the claims are brought to claim illegitimately damages from deep pockets of
business or government. This is plausible but nothing has shown this to be the
case. Nuisance claims are possible but the rate of success, as reflected in jury
verdicts, is not high; the abuse, if any, is not likely to be great. In any event,
these costs must always be set against the benefits in attacking behavior that
consciously flouts the rights of others.
If, however, disparities are found in the frequency and severity of punitive
awards in some jurisdictions it is fair to ask why that should be the case. This
is a task that Daniels and Martin set for further researchers. They, however,
venture some suggestions in the hot zone of Los Angeles in awards of punitive
damages for financial harms where a dramatic change occurred in the high end
of the award spectrum over the time intervals analyzed. They suggest that the
outlier figures are caused by bad faith breach insurance claims.' Elsewhere,
in examining medical malpractice data on plaintiff win rates in Indiana (on one
data set, 46% of malpractice claims settled with payout), they suggest the lack
of a competitive insurance market.2
This prompts a research strategy. Much of the criticism of punitive damages
has been devoted toward jury awards in Alabama. Jury verdict data reported by
the Wall Street Journal22 6 indicate that juries have awarded punitive damages
ten times more often than juries in other states. The median award is stated to
be $250,000, more than three times the national median. 7
222. Peter W. Huber, Liability: The Legal Revolution and Its Consequences 130-31 (1990)
(describing the exaction of punitive damages as "institutional punishment').
223. Steven Haywood, The Role of Punitive Damages in Civil Litigation: New Evidence From
Lawsuit Filings, Pacific Resource Institute for Public Policy (1996).
224. D&M, supra note 198, at 234; Roger C. Henderson, The Tort of Bad Faith in First-Party
Insurance Transactions After Two Decades, 37 Arizona L. Rev. 1153 (1995).
225. D&M, supra note 198, at 120.
226. Wall Street Journal, Wed. Nov. 2, 1994, S1 (comparison made with Georgia, Tennessee,
South Carolina, and North Carolina).
227. Professor George Priest is presently compiling and analyzing data drawn from the
"Alabama" experience. I have not had the opportunity of considering it at the time of writing this
article. See George L. Priest, Punitive Damages Reform: The Case of Alabama, 56 La. L. Rev. 825
(1996).
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What could account for the Alabama hot zone? First, a close examination
of the data is necessary. The data may represent jury awards unmodified by the
court on remittur or the appeal court on appellate review. The Alabama Trial
Lawyers Association claim this is substantial.' The reporting in Alabama
may be more accurate than in other states where punitive damages are not fully
reported. 9 Any research should control for differences in substantive law and
for the threshold test for the award of punitive damages.' In the former the
Alabama Supreme Court has pointed to the use of common law as a regulatory
device to fill the gap in consumer protection laws in the state."l Other states
with more adequate laws will not have the press of consumer related claims.
Further analysis of the Alabama experience is needed. 2 Do the larger
punitive damages awards occur predominantly in the financial loss cases or are
the cases clustered in bodily injury or property damage? Alabama statistics need
to be compared with the statistics in other jurisdictions with similar experiences
in litigation for the same mix of cases at the same time.
The embryonic state of research on punitive damages awards makes any
conclusions hazardous. The Congressional testimony of Professor George Priest
has stated that in 1992-93 of all tort cases in Bullock County, 76.5% included
a punitive damages claim; 65.1% in Lowndes County; and 78.3% in Barbour
County. Standing alone the figures are remarkable but cannot be meaningful
without comparative figures.233 Professor Priest's testimony in Johnson v. Life
of Georgia"" included the statement that the Alabama experience "is unparal-
leled in the history of American jurisprudence." 3 ' However, in contrast to
these claims for punitive damages, a review of the awards of large punitive
damages in Alabama from 1990 to 1994 is instructive.2"' One hundred twelve
228. Tort Reform Issues, 11/29/95 p.7.
229. Id. at 4.
230. On the latter Alabama requires "malice, willfulness, with wanton or reckless disregard for
the rights of others," a test that puts it squarely in the center of those allowing punitive damages.
Whitt v. Hulsey, 519 So. 2d 901, 906 (Ala. 1987).
231. Life Insurance Company of Georgia v. Johnson, 1996 Ala. Lexis 110, *21 (1996)
("Alabama citizens who became the victims of fraud have little recourse other than through
litigation").
232. In Johnson, id., the court referred to some statistics.
233. But see David G. Owen, Problems in Assessing Punitive Damages Against Manufacturers
of Defective Products, 49 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1, 54 n.268 (1982) punitive damages are sought in almost
every product liability case.
234. No. CV-93-969, 1996 WL 202543 (Ala.) (Cir. Ct. of Mobile County, Alabama 1996).
235. Quoted in Amnicus brief of the Business Council of Alabama in Support of Petitioner in
BMW of North American v. Gore, March 23, 1995.
236. The cases taken were those listed in Appendix IA of the Amicus brief for Petitioners in
BMW of North America Inc. v. Gore, 646 So. 2d 619 (Ala. 1994), cert. granted 115 S. Ct. 932
(1995). The same list was used in TXO Production Corp. v. Alliance Resources Corp., 509 U.S. 443,
113 S. Ct. 2711 (1993), in Pacific Mutual Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991),
and in HealthAmerica v. Menton, 551 So. 2d 235 (Ala.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 1093, 110 S. Ct. 1166
(1990).
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cases were listed in this time frame in which state courts had awarded large
punitive damages. Of the cases the problem counties accounted for only thirteen
awards. Bullock County has one case, and Barbour and Lowndes six each. As
one would have expected the more densely populated urban counties accounted
for the majority of punitive damages awards:
Jefferson - 24
Mobile - 24
Montgomery - 13
Seventy-two of all awards were in financial loss cases. Thirty-six of the
awards were for personal injuries, usually product liability cases. All the verdicts
from the three problem counties were for financial loss or harm. The complaint is
usually directed toward large awards against insurers in these counties. But in
terms of numbers revealed above the numbers of reported verdicts may be
commensurate with the rural, poor, and thinly populated nature of these coun-
ties.23 If the size of awards and settlements have been disproportionate to others
counties' experiences, no simple explanation is available. It may be that the courts
and juries lack experience with claims of this type. Jurors may have low
educational levels perhaps disinclining them from sympathizing with corporate
behavior. Defendants' wealth may dazzle juries whose life experience has never
exposed them to corporate folk ways and potential revenues. The defendant
insurers are not part of this community: they are not seen as contributors to its life
and welfare. The potency of effective plaintiffs' representation may weigh heavily
with a jury and judge that may relate to the plaintiffs' attorney rather than with a
remote insurer. Again in order to understand the punitive damages experience we
need research that investigates: (1) the patterns of legal representation, (2) the
relationship of the bar to the community, (3) the attitude of jurors to the partici-
pants, and (4) results stemming from all types of claims-financial harm, personal
injury, civil rights, and dignitary harm.
These data may demonstrate that highly effective plaintiff's attorneys have
found sympathetic courts and juries in these counties."' It is unlikely that
citizens in these counties have been singled out as targets of arrogant tortious
acts. If these counties are the "rotten boroughs" of tort liability, it may be like
the English rotten boroughs, that care must be taken in roundly condemning
institutions that do not conform with pristine premises. 9 As suggested
237. The Department of Geography of the University of Alabama has prepared county-by-county
comparisons in 1990 of population density, rural populations, urban population, white population,
black population, average value of owner-occupied housing units, unemployment rate, total
employment, estimated per capita income, poverty rate, and various measures of educational
achievements.
238. Cf. Peter Huber, No-Fault Punishment, 40 Ala. L. Rev. 1037, 1041 (1989) (pointing to
improved courtroom advocacy as fomenting litigation).
239. The rotten boroughs of England were in principle contrary to democratic presuppositions
of proportional representation. Yet they allowed for the appointment to Parliament of men of
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previously the law of punitive damages is a localizing rule that depends on the
jury for its application. The jury as an institution gives citizens a self-governing
capacity, encourages deliberation, and educates about responsibility. The highly
discretionary nature of the substantive rule bestows on judges and juries a
freedom in particular application that is subject to only loose review.
VIII. THE MISSING OF TARGETS
The strong localizing nature of punitive damages rules and the counter-
arguments of reformers to centralize and standardize the administration of justice
places the debate in the constitutional law maelstrom that sets local against
national regulation of social activities.2" The Supreme Court has maintained
the basic strength of the localizing consumer law made by adopting the due
process restrictions of appropriate jury instructions, post-trial review of
reasonableness to fit the aims of the award, and appellate review of the jury
award."' More recently the Alabama Supreme Court has decided that the trial
should be bifurcated between the liability stage and the damages stage in order
to limit the prejudicial evidence that may prejudice jury deliberations. The Court
also prescribes that the defendant's profiting from the conduct and wealth ought
to be in evidence to enable an award to sting. Any criminal sanctions are
relevant, as are other civil actions. 242 These provide a measure of discipline
and relevant information to juries. The extraordinary step by the Court was to
declare that half of the punitive damage award after payout of plaintiff's attorney
fees should be paid to the State General Fund. However, if the hot zones result
worth---"a nursery of statesmen," Sir William S. Holdsworth, A History of English Law, Vol. X, 567
(1936). They were abolished pursuant to the Reform Act, 1852, id., Vol. XIl, 6, 253-57. The
Supreme Court in BMW of North America v. Gore, 1996 U.S. Lexis 3390 (1996), confirms the local
focus of punitives but still insists on due process review.
240. The role of federalism is revivified in United States v. Lopez, 115 S. Ct. 1624 (1995)
(holding that Congress had exceeded its power to regulate commerce in enacting the Gun-Free School
Zones Act of 1990). In his concurring opinion Justice Kennedy (joined by Justice O'Connor)
stressed the republican ideal that federalism enhances freedom "by the creation of two governments,
not one." Id. at 1638. The government is responsible to the citizen, and liberty is realized by "two
distinct and discernable lines of political accountability: one between the citizens and the Federal
Government; the other between the citizens and the States." Id. Erwin Chemerinsky & Barry
Friedman, The Fragmentation of Federal Rules, 46 Mercer L. Rev. 757 (1995) (favoring uniformity
but recommending some flexibility to allow experimentation). See also the rules and standards
debate: Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 Duke L.J. 557 (1992);
Sunstein, supra note 194; Sandel, supra note 166, at 347 (arguing for federalism--s "disposed
sovereignty" and "citizenship formed across multiple sites of civic engagement"-in a pluralist
version of republican politics).
241. Pacific Mutual Life Ins. v. Haslip, 499 U.S. 1, 111 S. Ct. 1032 (1991). See also BMW of
North America v. Gore, 1996 U.S. Lexis 339 (1996) (emphasizing "sanctions for comparable
misconduct" as one of the "three guideposts").
242. Life Insurance Company of Georgia v. Johnson, 1996 Ala. Lexis 110 (1996).
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from a decay in the republican compact it is difficult to see how these
mechanisms will materially help.
The more radical solution is to abolish or cap punitive damages. Such
responses directly attack the rationale of the substantive law. The retributive
purpose as mediated by republican norms, long an established part of American
law, would be forfeited.243 The reforms represent a move to centralize
solutions away from the formative localizing institution of the jury. Centraliza-
tion has political implications where powerful interest groups may more readily
influence regulation.2" All this ventured for no demonstrable improvement in
pragmatic goals of certainty and predictability.
In conclusion, my argument is this. First, that the case has not been made
that punitive damages are problematic either nationally or locally. If "hot zones"
exist they require close study in order to discover the reasons for extraordinary
awards. In the absence of information, radical reforms are either meaningless
or destructive. While I am concerned about the waste engendered by meaning-
less law reform, it would not call for lengthy comment. However, it is
destructive law reform that is the grist of this essay. This forms my second
major conclusion. If I am correct that punitive damages have a prime place in
our republican ideals of the law, reforms that centralize decision-making, that
undermine exercise of jury discretion, are wrong. If the institution has gone
awry, attention should be paid to mending the presuppositions that nurture it,
rather than in devising reforms that derogate from the essential value of full
dominion of the citizen.
243. Cf Johnston, supra note 91, at 1406 (suggesting caps could severely weaken incentives for
safety).
244. Cass R. Sunstein, Interests Groups in American Public Law, 38 Stan. L. Rev. 29 (1985).
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